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This paper seeks to analyze the command and control issues arising from the 
advent of NCW.  It aims to contribute to a practical understanding of the concept and an 
implementation approach for NCW by attempting to provide an analytical framework,  
the various options/models, and considerations across the spectrum of NCW issues. 
While information superiority is not a new concept, the blazing speed of 
advancement in information technologies has brought about dramatic changes to our 
lifestyles and profound changes in the conduct of modern warfare. This led to the birth of 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW). NCW offers great opportunities to dramatically 
enhance combat prowess by exploiting shared situational awareness, increased speed of 
command, improved systems’ lethality and survivability, and greater flexibility achieved 
through self synchronization. However, these revolutionary changes do not depend on 
technology alone. In order to achieve the full promise of NCW, the entire span of 
elements ranging from organization, doctrine, and operational concepts to training must 
co-evolve.  
The success of NCW is dependent on aligning the organization’s commitment, 
resources and efforts, fostering a learning and innovative culture, constructing a seamless, 
robust and secure infostructure, and establishing measures of effectiveness of C2. The 
journey to NCW is not a linear process, but rather a spiral developmental process. 
Continued evolution and efforts are required to shape and deliver the enhanced combat 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Throughout history, military leaders have regarded information superiority as a 
cornerstone of military success. Even in ancient time, where manhood and heroism were 
highly upheld, Sun Tze wrote: 
He who has a thorough knowledge of himself and the enemy is bound to 
win in all battles. He who knows himself but not the enemy, has only a 
chance of winning. He who knows not himself and the enemy is bound to 
perish in all battles. 
In his book Command in War, Martin Van Creveld (Van Creveld, 1985) 
stipulated that the history of command (and control) consists essentially of an endless 
quest for certainty – certainty about the state and intentions of the enemy’s forces; 
certainty about the manifold factors that together constitute the environment in which the 
war is fought, from weather and the terrain to radioactivity and the presence of chemical 
warfare agents; and, last but definitely not least, certainty about the state, intentions, and 
activities of one’s own forces.  
Yet, Network Centric Warfare which is premised upon the attainment of 
information superiority - the importance of which has long been acknowledged and 
emphasized – is touted as the next most important RMA in the past 200 years (Cebrowski 
& Garstka, 1998).   
Information Superiority remains the linchpin of military victory. That has not 
changed. There is essentially no substitute for knowledge, or information superiority. 
Information superiority can be a force multiplier and the source of combat prowess. What 
has changed is the convergence of many capability-enabling technologies in an 
information-driven era coupled with the emergence of new threat scenarios. Together 
they have dramatically transformed the modern battlefield. This revolution is creating not 
only  quantitative, but also qualitative, changes in our operating environment that will 
bring about profound changes in the conduct of military operations. (US JCS, 2000)   
1 
1. Technology Advancement 
The rapid developments and underlying trends in information technologies are 
coalescing to accelerate and deliver an unprecedented transformation of the environment 
that we are operating in. These enabling technologies are advancing at a blazing pace 
which has been generalized into a number of laws:  
a. Moore’s Law 
Prescribed by Gordon E. Moore, then R&D Director at Fairchild 
Semiconductor in 1965, this law postulates that  the performance of computer chips will 
double approximately every eighteen months. These advances in the semiconductor 
fabrication technology, mainly due to increasing component density, translate to 
increasingly powerful computers, and at the same time to improved economics in 
proliferating  computer usage, both in terms of cost and size.  As an example, relative to 
the price of labor, processing power has become cheaper by a factor of 5 x 1012  over the 
last ten years or by a factor of five trillion! (McGray, 2003)  
b.  Law of Transmission Capacity 
This law suggests that the transmission capacity of fiber optic cable will 
double every nine months (Khoo, 2003). This showcases the advances in dense wave 
division multiplexing which is the key to enabling the significant increase of the 
internet. This translates into increasingly larger bandwidth available and faster download 
speeds for users. 
c.  Law of Storage 
The “Law of Storage” forecasts that for a given cost, storage capacity will 
double every twelve months (Khoo, 2003). This has led, for example, to the ability to 
have very high-resolution pictures stored in cameras and other portable digital devices. 
The above technological advances have brought about the phenomenal 
proliferation of computers, and fueled the exponential growth of the internet, intranets, 
and extranets. Combined with high-speed data access (enabled by the low cost laser) and 
the technologies for high-speed data-networking (hubs and routers), these have liberated 
computers and systems from many inter-operability constraints to create a network-
centric computing platform which has led in turn to a boom in the communities that 
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create, distribute, and exploit information “content” across an extremely heterogeneous 
global computing environment. 
d. Metcaltfe’s Law 
Named after Robert Metcalfe, inventor of the ethernet protocol and 
founder of 3Com, it describes the potential benefits brought about by networking 
technologies. While not about advances in the enabling technologies, Metcalfe’s Law has 
emerged as a central metaphor for the Internet Age. It postulates that although the cost of 
deploying a network increases linearly with the number of nodes in the network, the 
potential value of a network increases as a function of the square of the number of nodes 
that are connected by the network. To first order, it describes the potential number of 
information interactions that are enabled by a network of “N” nodes. To second order, it 
provides insight into the fact that the “value” of a network to the users of the network is 
primarily a function of the interaction between them (Alberts et al., 1999).  
These technological developments have revolutionized nearly every aspect 
of our lives and of the business world. Communications with distant friends no longer 
depends on postal letter or fax, but rather on quick and almost instantaneous e-mail and 
networking facilities. These technologies have created orders of magnitude increases in 
our ability to operate in the information domain, transforming our operation from one of 
information collection and processing to one of collaborative planning and execution.   
New internet or e-businesses also bring about new information-based business strategies 
that aim at locking-out competition and locking-in success premised on increasing 
instead of diminishing returns.  
The military is feeling the impact, too. The technological advances have 
ushered in an environment where time and space can be effectively compressed. 
Geographically dispersed forces can cooperate electronically through the distribution of 
awareness and knowledge in the battlespace. Decision timelines can be compressed with 
effective communications and networking. These have transformed the problem of 
warfare from a series of static events to a more continuous one, and portend an ultimate 
merging of the disparate planning and execution processes into a seamless form of 
command and control. 
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2. Expanded Spectrum of Conflict and Changing Threats  
The Information Era is changing the battlespace in three fundamental ways, 
namely, the expansion of the spectrum of conflict, the changing nature of the battlefield,  
and the ‘Media Factor’; referring to the ubiquity of the media.  
a. Expanded Spectrum of Conflict  
The spectrum of conflict has expanded over the years. During the bi-polar 
Cold War Era, the world was poised for a conventional war between the two 
superpowers. The collapse of the Bradenburg gate and the Soviet Union, however,  have 
given rise to localized conflicts and rogue states. These resulted in increased occurrences 
of operations other than war (OOTW), from humanitarian relief, peace enforcement to 
most notably, terrorism. Unlike conventional warfare that is pitted between nation states 
or clans – generally with visible organization and physical boundaries of influence, 
OOTW can sometimes mean fighting an enemy that is in hiding and yet almost 
omnipresent. Unlike conventional warfare which is preceded by stages from preparation 
to declared hostilities, OOTW can happen anywhere anytime. These asymmetrical threats 
can become even more potent with the increased lethality and accessibility of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD). It can be extremely manpower and attention draining for a 
conventional military force to safeguard against such attacks. Information and correlation 
of events and trends are thus critical to raising the alarm and compressing the execution 
time for an effective response.  The fact that the form of the enemy is unclear will blur 
the distinction between domestic and foreign, and civilian and military threats. The 
boundaries are becoming less distinct and more complex. Information  must be available 
at higher levels of resolution to help in ascertaining the friend and the foe.    
b. Changing Nature of the Battlefield 
A new form of warfare has also emerged. With today’s information being 
largely stored and transacted in 0 and 1s, information operations or cyberwar, has the 
potential to totally redefine the nature of warfighting. It will blur the boundaries between 
civilian and military responsibilities. Information attacks, not necessary at military 
targets, but also at critical civil/business institutions can cause havoc by detrimentally 
undermining a country’s interests without even dropping a bomb! Essentially, the nature 
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of war has become more diverse and sophisticated.  Important safeguards must be in-
place to protect against such vulnerabilities and prevent such occurrences.  
c. The Media Factor 
The ubiquity of the western media has brought about two effects. The first 
is an increase in the tempo of operations, and the second is the loss of secrecy by   
bringing each and every event under the intense scrutiny of the public. 
Exploiting the advances in information technologies, the media has 
harnessed the same benefits of instantaneous communications and greater bandwidth as 
the military. This has enabled them to provide regular and timely updates of the battle 
situation to anyone. Instantaneous imagery is no longer held just within the warfighting 
forces. It was said that even warring forces watched TV programs for intelligence 
information. In fact, deposition of combat forces may no longer be kept secret for long. 
Military decision makers are pressured to assimilate information fast, decide fast, and 
move and act even faster to achieve tactical surprise and to safeguard against the media 
compromising the required secrecy. 
Today’s war is no longer fought just in the deep jungles or the vast 
deserts, it is also enacted via the TV right in the living rooms of millions of people 
around the world. Under intense public scrutiny, a single event can be exploited way out 
of proportion to its significance. So the saying goes, “Bad news is good news”. Military 
decision makers have to rethink the allocation of targets and the possible extent of 
collateral damage, which might invite international outcry once the gory images were 
published. Military combatants must be aware of the media to make sure that it does not 
take on a route of its own to denounce the war and dictate its outcome. Increasingly, the 
military will be judged not only by whether or not a mission was accomplished, but also 
whether or not it accomplished the mission with an appropriate level of force, or the 
minimum level required to achieve the effect. Traditional military operations, conceived 
and conducted under the doctrine of overwhelming force, may prove to have adverse 
political consequences. The military will have to leverage the new information toolkit to 
achieve more stealthy maneuvers, while at the same time, managing public expectations 
on what it can and cannot achieve or avoid.  
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With the end of the “Cold War”, defense budgets around the world were 
generally on a visible decline in anticipation of an era of peace. Between 1989 and 1999, 
world defense expenditure dropped by some 35%. Defense budgets of developed 
countries suffered the most, shrinking some 48% over the same period (U.S. DVBC, 
2002).  By early 1989, the trend towards more relaxed relations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union was firmly established and most NATO countries had started 
reducing their military forces. However, the hope of an era of peace soon dissipated after 
the 9/11 event which portended the emergence of terrorism. A period of ‘troubled peace’ 
has been ushered in, giving rise to new perceptions of threats. But most of the forces have 
already been stripped down. Also, given the economic reality, few governments can 
increase defense spending and the force structure with impunity. New ways of warfare 
must be explored to equip the nation with greater combat power. This impetus also gives 
rise to the rapid refocus onto NCW.  
All in all, the technological advances and the changes in the battlespace  
conceived the birth of NCW. The military-economic developments/realities expedited  
embracing new information age warfare. These changes have fundamentally transformed 
our attitude towards gathering of information, tolerance of uncertainty, acceptance of the 
fog of war, and the landscape and environment of modern battlespace. These have very 
fundamental implications to the conduct of warfare, and in fact, go to the core of how 
command and control, and its various constituent domains, can be best constructed and 
optimized.  
B. PURPOSE  
This thesis analyses the command and control issues arising from the advent of 
NCW, the why and how to organize, operate, construct and optimize the various domains 
of command and control in order to achieve the promised ‘order of magnitude’ increase 
in combat or warfighting capabilities.  
While many have written on the subject of NCW, few have gone beyond an 
exciting yet obscure vision of an end-state and the journey towards it. In fact, more recent 
writings seem to be moving even further into conceptual and theoretical aspects, and 
arguably, little tangible progress has been made. This thesis, hence, is not intended  as 
another theoretical disquisition on the subject, but rather the principal goal of this thesis 
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is to attempt to provide an analytical framework for the military decision-maker and the  
various options/models, or considerations in understanding and implementing the 
concept.   
This study aims to contribute to a practical understanding of the concept and an  
approach towards NCW. Such understanding is critical in shaping the force structure and 
operational doctrine of future organizations, and their warfighting capabilities.  
C. SCOPE 
The thesis seeks to answer a series of command and control questions related to 
NCW:  
What is the NCW concept?  
How should we organize to take advantage of NCW?  
How should C2 processes evolve? 
How should the various domains of C2 be constructed to better align with NCW? 
What is the roadmap for implementing NCW?  
This thesis will be based on literature research and analysis on the topic of 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW). In addition, findings from experimental exercises such 
as Global ’98 will also be used as appropriate. Its main focus will be on the command and 
control issues. While the research may be based on the US experience and model, the 
conclusion drawn is intended for military organizations in a more general context.  
As the author is no proclaimed expert or authority in the subject matter, the study 
will not have the definitive solution for NCW implementation or indoctrination. 
Nevertheless, in attempting to provide more practical value, this thesis will strive to 
narrow down the options or implementation models. Where not practicable, however, the 
considerations affecting decision  will be explicated instead.  
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The thesis starts by examining the changing battlespace landscape and the 
impetus of NCW. It will review the definition and concept of NCW explicated in current 
literature, and then attempt to analyze the implications at hand and challenges that lie 
ahead. On the command and control aspect, analysis will also be based on organizational 
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theory, as well as results from the A2C2 (Adaptive Architectures for Command and 
Control) research program. The thesis will conclude with a proposed roadmap to embrace 
NCW.  
E. CHAPTERS OVERVIEW 
Chapter 1 - Introduction. This chapter explains the background and factors that 
led to the conception and birth of the NCW concept.   
Chapter II – Network Centric Warfare (NCW). This chapter seeks the definition 
of NCW, and establishes a conceptual framework for analysis, comprising impetus, 
means and outcome. It provides a glimpse on the attributes of NCW and its potential 
benefits supported by findings from experimental exercises.  
Chapter III – Command and Control Organization. This chapter dwells on the 
organizational structure of command and control, explicating the contentions between 
network vis-à-vis hierarchy, and centralization vis-à-vis decentralization. It draws 
organizational design models and guidelines from the Adaptive Architectures for  
Command and Control (A2C2) research program, as well as from a review of 
organizational theory. 
Chapter IV – C2 Doctrine and Process.  This chapter  deliberates the doctrinal 
impact NCW. It revisits the various cyclical models of the C2 process, and explores the 
notion of self-synchronization and continuity in the C2 process.  
Chapter V – C2 Infostructure and Systems. The networking infrastructure and the 
information systems are the supporting means and key enabler for the pursuit of NCW. 
This chapters looks at the issues concerning the establishment  and design of the 
information grids and the information systems to support the new warfare concept in an 
information era.  
Chapter VI – The roadmap towards NCW. This chapter  lists the success factors 
and outlines the key steps for NCW implementation. It is noted that the roadmap is not a 
linear process but rather a cyclical, or spiral journey.  
Chapter VII – Conclusion. This chapter presents some of the daunting challenges 
facing NCW, and also highlights some of the potential pitfalls.  
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II. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE (NCW) 
A. DEFINITION 
A review of the literature yields a number of definitions for Network 
Centric Warfare. The more representative ones are listed below:  
1.   “Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is an information superiority-
enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat power by 
networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared 
awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, 
greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-
synchronization. In essence, NCW translates information superiority into 
combat power by effectively linking knowledge entities in the 
battlespace.” (Logan, 2003). 
2. “Network-Centric Warfare derives its power from the strong 
networking of a well-informed but geographically dispersed force. The 
enabling elements are a high-performance information grid, access to all 
appropriate information sources, weapons reach and maneuver with 
precision and speed of response, value-adding command-and-control (C2) 
processes--to include high-speed automated assignment of resources to 
need--and integrated sensor grids closely coupled in time to shooters and 
C2 processes. Network-centric warfare is applicable to all levels of 
warfare and contributes to the coalescence of strategy, operations, and 
tactics. It is transparent to mission, force size and composition, and 
geography.” (Cebrowski, 1998).  
3.  “A  Warfighting Concept that enables a Network Centric Force to 
significantly increase combat power by achieving increased awareness, 
shared awareness, degree of interoperability, survivability, lethality, 
responsiveness, operational tempo, and ability to self-synchronize”. 
(Alberts & Garstka, Dec 1999).  
Three elements are clearly distinctive from the above definitions. These are the 
Impetus of NCW, the Means to establish it, and the Outcome/Benefits it aims to achieve, 




























Figure 1.   Conceptual Framework   
 
1. Impetus 
 NCW is premised on the concept of Information Superiority. Information has the 
three key dimensions of relevance, accuracy, and timeliness (Alberts et al., 1999).  See 
Fig. 1.  A position of information superiority is attained when the information 
available/created establishes the player in a dominant vantage as compared to its 
competitor, whereby the player is superior in no less than one key dimension and at least 
equal in the other dimensions vis-à-vis its competitor. Such an information superior 
position can be exploited to derive competitive advantage. Taking an analogy from the 
business world, the information superior position can be exploited to lock-in 
success/victory, and lock-out competition/threats. This is the impetus of NCW.   
2. Means 
What then are the means to establish the higher vantage point in the information 
domain? Essentially, the enhanced richness and reach of the information is established by 
access to all appropriate information sources, primarily among all the warfighting 
10 
enterprises, despite geographical dispersion. Three primary parties or roles need to be 
connected, namely, sensors, decision makers and shooters/weapon systems. The 
technicality of this infostructure or domain is further elaborated in subsequent chapters. 
For now, it suffices to note that the accesses can be enabled through high performance 
information grids (such as integrated sensor grid) to closely couple and disseminate 
information (such as situation awareness) among the parties involved.  These networks 
aim to support the distribution of common situation awareness, and facilitate 
collaborative planning and execution.  
3. Outcome 
It is important to note that technology is but one of the key elements of NCW. 
Successful transformation from platform-centric to a net-centric force not only entails the 
co-evolution of technology, organization, and doctrine, but also a basic change in the 
mindset. With a synergistic conglomeration of the various NCW elements, enhanced 
combat capabilities could be delivered in the following areas:  
a. Decision Superiority 
b.       Dominant Maneuver 
c.       Precision Engagement 
d.       Focused Logistics 
e.       Full Dimensional Protection 
The critical question is the big HOW? In another words, how to translate the 
means, that is, information networking, to war-winning, information dominating NCW 
enhanced combat power. The subsequent chapters will attempt to answer the question of 
HOW, but the remainder of this chapter will elaborate on the attributes and characteristics 
of NCW, and provide a glimpse of the enhanced combat capabilities that could be 
harnessed.  
C. ATTRIBUTES/CHARACTERISTICS  
NCW may be characterized by:   
1. Extensive Connectivity and Interoperability 
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Clearly, the first and foremost characteristic that would come to mind is the 
extensive connectivity in the NCW environment. A robust, high-performance 
infostructure that provides all elements of the warfighting enterprise with access to high-
quality information services will be established. The number of information sources and 
combat nodes to integrate will be an order of magnitude more than in the past. Implicit, 
though it cannot be taken for granted, is a greater degree of inter-operability, and thus co-
operation, among the warfighters.     
2. Common and Shared Situational Awareness 
Traditionally, the battlespace in the theatre of operations is often segmented and 
the responsibilities of updating the awareness within the localized area is parsed to 
different combat entities. Their respective situational pictures are communicated through 
voice or electronic pointers, collated and presented on large display boards manually. 
This has resulted in significant barriers and delays in  pulling together a complete picture 
for the entire Area of Operation (AOR). NCW, enabled by the increased network 
bandwidth, will see a proliferation of common operating pictures (COPs) transcending 
through and distributed across the military hierarchies, from the strategic level to the 
lower echelons. These COPs will be collated by a central agency or key nodes through 
sensor and systems input spanning the operating theatre, before being pushed down to the 
lower echelons. Notably, though, at the lower echelon, the coverage of the COP may be 
within a much smaller geographical span - hence the notion of the Common Relevant 
Operating Picture (CROP) - as compared to the “Big Picture” at the operational/strategic 
levels. 
A common and shared situational awareness is the direct result of the distribution 
of these COPs, which are usually supplemented with peripheral operational information. 
This shared awareness reduces the fog of war and increases the certainty and quality of 
decision-making.    
3.  Co-operative Sensing 
In platform-centric combat such as in air-to-air engagement, the shooter would 
usually have its organic sensors for the purpose of target acquisition and fire control. In 
network-centric combat, however, the sensor and shooter may be decoupled as a result of 
co-operative sensing. Premised on a high performance engagement grid, the shooter no 
longer needs to depend solely on its organic sensors. It can grasp data from the 
engagement grid and use it for target sorting and engagement. Similarly, a station or even 
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a command center, no longer just depends on its local sensors. Rather, it collates 
information from sensors and systems throughout the operating theatre to form a 
comprehensive situational picture of the battlespace.   
4. Collaborative Planning and Execution 
Traditionally, planning is done centrally or at one locality. Increasingly though, 
collaborative tools are available to aid planners by soliciting specialist feedback directly 
from the combatant without relying just on faxed reports. While sectorised operations 
may have been the modus operandi previously, more collaborative execution can be 
exercised without strict adherence to operating boundaries given shared and enhanced 
situational   awareness of each others’ activity. In that sense, arbitration or optimization at 
the next higher level may be less required, and may be left to the lower echelons to sort 
out among themselves. This is referred to as the self-synchronization ability, or “the 
ability of a well-informed force to organize and synchronize complex warfare activities 
from the bottom up” (Cebrowski, 1998). 
5. Compression of Time and Space 
The instantaneous nature of communications means that time and space for 
information flow are being compressed. No longer, will there be a need to send copies of 
a mission order through fax (which could take up to hours). In fact, combatants can be 
sent out to the battlespace with initial missions, and the higher resolution details of 
targets, for example, can be followed up, thereby dramatically compressing the entire 
mission cycle.  Similarly, geographically dispersed forces are no longer handicapped by 
the spatial distance apart. Networking has brought a wider geographical area under the 
span of co-operation/control of any single combat entity. Modern communication and 
networking technologies have eradicated undue transit delays and as a result, increase the 
operational tempo and responsiveness of modern warfare.   
D. BENEFITS – ENHANCED COMBAT POWER 
NCW is touted to deliver greatly enhanced combat prowess. The following 
paragraphs provide a glimpse of these benefits supported by a consolidation of 




1.  Decision Superiority 
Decision superiority is a direct benefit of information superiority that provides 
military forces the competitive combat edge. However, it is important to note that 
availability of information does not automatically translate into decision superiority, it 
must be filtered through warfighter’s experience, knowledge, training and judgment, 
honed by organizational and doctrinal adaptation, relevant training and experience, and 
facilitated by the proper command and control mechanisms. Also, decision superiority 
does not refer only to the capability of the commanders to make decisions, but rather to 
the warfighting force to make decisions as a whole, that is, including, valued-added from 
combatants and supporting staff at the various echelons, and the efficiency of the 
associated processes.  
JTIDS Operational Special Project demonstrated the increased mission 
effectiveness as a result of decision superiority. In an  experiment which compared the 
operational performance of Air Force F-15Cs performing counter air operations with and 
without data links, the Air Force found that the kill ratio increased by over 100 percent 
with network-centric operations. This increased combat power is a result of the 
significantly enhanced battlespace awareness that was provided to the pilots operating 
with tactical data links. Components of awareness included weapons loading of the blue 
force, real-time position of the blue and red force, and status of blue engagements. The 
net result was a significantly improved decision-making capability in orienting, sorting 
and engaging targets (US DoD, 2001). Findings from recent All Service Combat 
Identification Evaluation Team (ASCIET) Exercises reinforced these findings. (Alberts et 
al., 1999) 
2. Dominant Maneuver 
Dominant maneuver is the ability of Joint forces to gain positional advantage with 
decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo in the achievement of assigned 
military tasks (US JCS, 2000). NCW enables dominant maneuver through adaptive and 
concurrent planning, co-ordination of geographically dispersed units, gathering of timely 
feedback on the status, location, and activities of subordinate units, and the anticipation 
of the course of events leading to mission accomplishment.  These allow the   efficient 
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scaling and massing of force or forces that were widely dispersed, as well as massing of 
the effects of their fire, and thereby achieve the objective of dominant maneuver.  
Operational Gains of Digitization '89 showed the benefits of reducing the time 
taken for planning, responding to a call for fire, mounting an attack, and moving to 
contact in delivering the impact of dominant maneuver. The U.S. Army’s Division XXI 
AWE produced dramatic results by killing over twice the enemy in half the time at over 
three times the battlespace with 25 percent fewer combat platforms as a result of 
successful employment of information age technology in dominant maneuver (Bond, 
1998). 
3. Precision Engagement  
Precision Engagement is the ability of Joint forces to locate, survey, discern, and 
track objectives or targets; select, organize, and use the correct systems; generate desired 
effects; assess results; and reengage with decisive speed and overwhelming operational 
tempo as required, throughout the full range of military operations (US JCS, 2000).  
NCW enhances forces’ ability to engage targets with greater precision, and at 
reduced vulnerability, through improved situational awareness and co-operative sensing. 
Lethality of combat power is a function of the amount of fire power, its reach and its 
precision. NCW enables closer co-ordination and co-operation of fire power. Through a 
co-operative network of sensors that provides high performance, engagement quality 
information, the weapon reach and precision of the shooting platform can be significantly 
enhanced.  
In platform-centric operations, combat aircraft frequently depend on their organic 
sensor for weapon delivery and even early warning. However, especially in a hostile area, 
emitting the organic sensor is a double-edged sword. While it improves situational 
awareness and guides weapon delivery, it also gives up the secrecy of one’s location and 
the element of tactical surprise. This renders the aircraft susceptible to enemy counter 
response, and hence reduces its survivability. However, in NCW, the combat plane can  
depend on other sensors, staying stealthy for as long as possible, thus increasing the 
element of surprise and hence mission effectiveness, while reducing its vulnerability. 
Such scenarios are readily observed in any of the air battle experiments such as the attack 
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operations with tactical data links in the JTIDS Operational Special Project mentioned 
above. 
New operational concepts such as CEC (Co-operative Engagement Concept) also 
bring about extensions in the engagement envelopes, and even beyond line-of-sight 
engagement. The CEC concept enables incoming targets to be engaged in depth with 
multiple shooters and increased probability of kill. At the same time, survivability of the 
shooting platform is enhanced by using engagement quality information generated by 
sensors not organic to the shooting platform, and perhaps beyond line-of-sight of its 
adversary. In comparison, combat power in platform-centric operations is  often 
marginalized by the inability of the platform to generate engagement quality awareness at 
ranges greater than or equal to the maximum weapon employment envelope. 
The U.S. Navy Fleet Battle Experiment series also provided proof of precision 
engagement in an NCW environment. (Alberts et al., 1999). This is an annual Joint and 
combined exercise sponsored by Combined Forces Command, Korea. During Fleet Battle 
Experiment (FBE) Delta, conducted in October 1998 in conjunction with Exercise Foal 
Eagle ’98, the network-centric concepts experimented with within FBE Delta linked 
Army and Navy sensors and shooters in unprecedented ways. For example, in the 
Counter SOF Mission, the seemingly intractable problem of countering hundreds of 
North Korean special operations boats was dealt with on a timeline previously not 
thought possible. The application of network-centric concepts enabled Army helicopters, 
P-3s, LAMPS, AC-130s, and land- and carrier-based aircraft units to share a common 
operational picture and synchronize their efforts from the bottom up. This self-
synchronization demonstrated the capability for leakers to be reduced by an order of 
magnitude and the operational mission to be accomplished in half the time required, 
compared to traditional platform-centric operations.  
During Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia between August-September 1995, 
NATO aircrews flew 3,515 sorties of which over  60 percent were flown by shooters. 
Aircrews successfully attacked over 97 percent of the targets and destroyed or inflicted 
serious damage on more than 80 percent of them. The target set, which consisted of over 
338 aim points within 48 complexes, was painstakingly selected, checked, and rechecked 
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to virtually eliminate risk to civilian life and property. During the entire operation, only a 
single aircraft, a French Mirage 2000K, was shot down (Tirpak, 1987). Mission success 
was made possible by timely and accurate information, such as status and disposition of 
own and adversary forces, which manifested in the increased  precision and lethality, 
reduced collateral damage, and minimal losses.  
4. Focused Logistics 
Focused Logistics is the ability to provide the Joint force the right personnel, 
equipment, and supplies in the right place, at the right time, and in the right quantity, 
across the full range of military operations (US JCS, 2000). NCW realizes this capability 
through a real-time, web-based information system providing total asset visibility as part 
of a common relevant operational picture, effectively linking the operator and logistician 
across Services and support agencies.  
The U.S. Navy Fleet Battle Experiment series provided proof of the enormous 
potential of such logistics self-synchronization in an NCW environment. (Alberts et al., 
1999). NCW enables a mechanism for pushing logistics in anticipation of need. For 
example, one can easily envision a situation in ground operations where near real time 
information on consumption of fuel and ammunition in weapons platforms (e.g., M1A2 
Tanks, M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles) combined with an agreed-to rule set could 
significantly improve logistical support. In fact, information on fuel consumption and 
ordnance expenditure is currently collected in real time with sensors embedded in F-18 
aircraft. 
5. Full Dimensional Protection  
Full Dimensional Protection is the ability of the Joint force to protect its personnel 
and other assets required to decisively execute assigned tasks (US JCS, 2000). Full 
dimensional protection is achieved through the tailored selection and application of 
multilayered active and passive measures, within the domains of air, land, sea, space, and 
information across the range of military operations with an acceptable level of risk.  
During Fleet Battle Experiment Delta (Alberts et al., 1999), land-based fire-finder 
radars and sea-based AEGIS radars were integrated into an experimental sensor network. 
This sensor network provided the ground component commander with significantly 
enhanced battlespace awareness to support the prosecution of the counter fire mission. 
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This increased awareness also increases survivability by enabling a pilot to select a route 
that exploits terrain masking and presents a reduced signature to known air defense 
radars.  
As the ranges of our sensors and weapons increase and our ability to move 
information rapidly improves, we are no longer geographically constrained. Hence, in 
order to generate a concentrated effect, it is no longer necessary to concentrate forces. 
This allows us to reduce our battlespace footprint, which in turn reduces risk because we 
avoid presenting the enemy with attractive, high-value targets. It also expands the 
concept of maneuver by reducing the need for the transportation or movement of physical 
objects, a very time-consuming and expensive task.  
In Expeditionary Force Experiment ‘98, split-base operations were tried and 
demonstrated the potential to both decrease the time required to initiate air operations and 
free up transport aircraft to move combat capability into theatre. Notably, such dispersion 
of  assets provides not only a smaller footprint, but also reduced vulnerability of ‘putting 
all eggs in one basket’. (Horner, 1998) 
In summary, the overall effect of superior information is creating more teeth and 
less tail. Forces can be deployed with a smaller logistics trail, and hence a less 
conspicuous footprint. However, there is also more teeth in NCW forces. The entire 
network of forces could be fighting as a whole, not as single platforms or just regiments 
of troops, bringing enormous fire power to bear. Force multiplying benefits could be 
achieved as a result of greater inter-operability, co-operation and battlefield knowledge. 
Reduced vulnerability is possible with heightened awareness, and improved 
responsiveness to avoid risk/dangers. The lethality of fire power is increased through 
increased precision and extended reach as a result of the collaborative effort among 
forces and the sensor network. All these add to the greater combat prowess to be attained 
in NCW.   
E. IMPACT TO COMMAND AND CONTROL  
The potential benefits of shared and increased battlespace awareness, and a 
compressed and responsive decision cycle have fundamental implications to warfare 
doctrine. It is more than just injecting information technology in the form of information 
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infrastructure or infostructure.  There are many issues that we need to grapple with, from 
rethinking the organizational configuration, doctrinal principles, and concept of 
operations to the implementation challenges of the various domains within command and 
control. The many factors cannot be analyzed in isolation. Each of these factors serves to 


























III. COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATION 
A. COMMAND AND CONTROL  
Command and control is asserting increasing importance with the advent of 
NCW. In the platform-centric years of warfighting, command and control has always 
been in the backstage, in the supporting role. The supersonic missiles, the high 
performance, new generation fighter aircraft, the stealthy frigates have been the main 
focuses, in part to showcase their combat prowess for the purpose of deterrence. 
However, over the years, command and control is increasingly in the limelight. The 
growing complexity and needed investment in C2 have grown exponentially. Its central 
role in maximizing combat effectiveness and force multiplying benefits in an networked 
environment have rendered  C2 a critical component in tomorrow’s warfare.    
As defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms:, Command and control is “ the exercise of authority and direction by a 
properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the 
mission.” (Joint Pub 1-02, 1998).  
In essence, the main goal of command and control (C2) is to promote unity of 
efforts among all elements of a force so as to execute a mission most effectively and 
efficiently, and with least casualties. This lies not only in the ability of a commander, but 
also his entire control apparatus at all levels, to make the most out of the situation.  
The advent of NCW thus has great impact to command and control organization 
as it entails a rethink of today’s C2 organizations, doctrine, and processes, among others. 
One thing is certain, the current hierarchical C2 structure existing in most militaries today 
ought to be revisited. A rethink of how best to organize the command and control 
structure and activities is necessary to address the advances in the technological 
developments and to exploit maximum advantage of the emerging concept of NCW.  
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the key issues and decision 
considerations  concerning C2 organization in an NCW environment. While it would not 
be possible to propose the ideal C2 organization  for NCW, at least not at this moment, 
this chapter suggests some considerations towards achieving an optimized C2 structure, 
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and the pitfalls to avoid. It will also touch upon the robust and adaptive organizational 
model developed under the Adaptive Architectures for Command and Control (A2C2) 
Research program, as well as a perspective from Organizational Theory.    
B. CURRENT C2 ORGANIZATION 
Ever since the Levee en Masses, the hierarchy approach of the Napoleonic model 
(corps-division-brigade-regiment-battalion-company-platoon) has been the mainstay of 
today’s military organization, so much so that this type of organization has become the 
de-facto operational command structure. Usually helmed by a flag or general officer, and 
then branched into service or functional components, a typical Joint force C2 setup 
comprises several levels, from the decision-maker, planning, to the execution. This 
traditional structure is borne out of three key factors. First, the growing size, complexity 
and specialization of military forces require a robust arrangement to conduct and control 
its activities. Second, human limitation in the span of control. Based on human factors 
studies, a rough guide for an acceptable span of control is about 5 plus or minus 2 
(Alberts et al., 1999), considering the number of entities a human individual could 
effectively manage.  This relatively small span of control  has resulted in the multi-
layered structure of a large military organization.  Third, the safeguarding of information 
secrecy. In order to preserve the element of surprise and safeguard secret information, the 
multi-layered structure serves  as a convenient vehicle to compartmentalize information 
on a need-to-know basis for each echelon.  In the US Air Force, for example, C2 and 
planning tend to be centralized, as the complete information/picture, at least at the 
operational level, is consolidated at the central location. This was aimed to ensure better 
optimization of forces and efforts across the larger span of forces.  Execution is generally  
decentralized though, to the local commander for expediency, and being the one with the 
best localized tactical picture.     
C. NETWORK VERSUS HIERARCHICAL 
A hierarchical structure is inherently incompatible with a network centric 
environment. The processes of a netted force operating in a network centric environment 
are intuitively at odds with the rigid and tightly controlled nature of military hierarchy. A 
key advantage of a networked community is the instantaneous and simultaneous 
dissemination of information to all the combat entities. Clearly, the layering and 
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dependence on serial interchanges inherent in an hierarchical organization can impede the 
speed of command and slow down the operational tempo. Yet, the essence of the 
pyramidal command structure and line of responsibility and accountability must be 
maintained for the purpose of command and control, rather than left to a laissez faire 
state of affairs.  
A balance must be struck between the rigid, yet assuring, hierarchical structure 
and the laissez faire approach that promotes freedom of interaction. As a result of 
networking, the hierarchical organization may become flatter. The flatter organization is 
aimed at promoting express channels of communications while not diluting the essence of 
command and control in the military organization. It frees up information flow from the 
chain of command to increase speed of command so as to lock out adversarial options 
and achieve option dominance, while continuing to orchestrate and optimize resources at 
a higher level.  
A new approach to effectively flatten hierarchies is needed. Streamlining the 
operational command chain alone to achieve a flatter structure does  not suffice. Unlike 
previously where our organization’s effectiveness and efficiency is enhanced through 
trimming down the size of an organization, the new approach must be more wholesome. 
The resulting organization created must be a co-evolution of a number of inextricably 
linked factors. These factors include,  
a. Removing Impediments to Speed 
Lessons of fledging Information Age organizations that restricted 
information flow to the hierarchy has shown that such rigidity is a losing strategy. 
(Pascale, 1998). It makes little sense to devote the scarce resources to restrict information 
to the extent we had in the past, while trying to achieve the exact opposite. Rather than 
restrict all information, and provide only the absolute necessity to the lower echelons, the 
rationalization of information filtering or compartmentalization must take a new 
perspective. In the spirit of free information flow and interaction, all information must be 
permitted other than those that must be safeguarded to protect secrecy of sources, plans 




With the proliferation of COPs, C2 nodes at the various echelons gain  
enhanced awareness which is translated into better battlespace knowledge of the situation 
and self-synchronization. These lead to less need for frequent co-ordination and collation 
of situation awareness or picture, which constitutes a major part of the workload. 
However, it is also conceivable that removing intermediate echelons may increase 
workload at the various levels as a result of increased command responsibility. The span 
of control with respect to the workload and the systems available to help each node 
manage information must be considered. Alternatively, novel methods to manage the 
overwhelming information can be experimented with to control the workload. One such 
method is the use of ‘Knowledge Managers’.     
The concept of “Knowledge Managers’ was employed in Global Wargame 
’99.  The “Knowledge Managers” ensured players could prioritize, analyze, display, and 
disseminate only what was required by the senior commander. It helped the senior 
commander to better grasp the deluge of information accessible at his fingers tips, and 
alleviate the tendency, as Barnett says, to become “control freaks”. (Barnett, 1999). 
Without these Knowledge Managers, the resultant information saturation might cause 
inaction among the participants.  
c.  Information Systems 
The information systems available are critical to the structure of the 
organization, and in part determine the workload at each node. The streamlining and 
freeing up of the information flows must be done hand-in-hand with the introduction of 
information and communications systems. Collaborative tools may ease up 
communication problems and facilitate collaborative processes.  Smart knowledge 
programs may allow the end-user to sort, pull and push information at the ease of their 
finger tips, enhance productivity and minimize the negative effects of the plethora of 
information. Equally important is the appropriate and optimal usage of these systems. 
One thing is getting  the information system installed, another is to fully utilize them.  It 
is important for people not to continue to operate and communicate in the old ways which 
may such sub-optimize the new systems and  hence not derive the full benefits that  
should be derived.   
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D. CENTRALIZATION VERSUS DECENTRALIZATION 
The result of the proliferation of COP is greatly enhanced and shared situational 
awareness laterally and vertically across the command and control structure. This reduces 
the fog of war and minimizes discrepancies in situational awareness across different 
echelons and laterally among the combat entities.  The boundary of strategic, operational 
and tactical domains is blurred as a result. On one hand, this allows the central command 
to assert greater control, while on the other hand, it enables greater autonomy of the 
lower echelons on the premise of better awareness. Therein lies the main contention of 
organization of command and control in a NCW environment.  
1. Decentralization 
The key merits of decentralization are speed of command and empowerment of 
warfighters.  Proponents of decentralization argue that “the key to NCW is to generate 
such high tempo that the high level commander would be incapable of conducting any 
kind of traditional planning process fast enough to keep up” (Zachery, 2000). This speed 
could only be achieved through the autonomy of the lower echelons. With better 
awareness, these lower echelon units can self-synchronize towards mission objective and 
value–add with initiative, without top-down spoon–feeding directives. These save 
precious time, and eradicate the tedious and detailed  planning requirements at the higher 
level. 
In the future, tactical level commanders will have a better understanding of both 
the big picture and the local situation. Some proponents of decentralization go as far as 
saying that the resulting self-synchronization ability would allow so much greater 
autonomy and empowerment of the combat entities that little planning would be required 
at the higher command. Therein lies the concerns that command and control may 
deteriorate into laissez faire, thus disintegrating rather the integrating the war efforts.  
2. Centralization 
The premise of centralization lies in central orchestration being necessary to 
achieve maximum optimization of resources and efforts. “The likelihood that greater 
experience and knowledge will reside at higher command echelons would seem to argue 
for centralizing decision making and control to the fullest extent allowed by 
communication capacity”. (Fitzsimonds,1998). Taking into consideration the CNN factor, 
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this proposition is even more palpable. In this day and age of instant media imagery, 
international law considerations, and crucial public opinion, leaders like General Clark 
have argued that every tactical action has strategic implications (Clark, 2001). The 
unintentional bombing of the Chinese Embassy during Operation Allied Force is a classic 
case of a tactical action directly affecting the national-strategic level of war. Therefore, 
the belief is that senior leaders need to keep close control of tactical operations to ensure 
achievement of strategic objectives. Some proponents even go as far as saying that 
maintaining a centralized command and centralized execution structure eradicates the 
need for clear commander’s intent because the tactical level will always be in contact 
with the operational and strategic leadership. Therein lies the concerns of centralization.  
 This concern arises when centralization is taken to the extreme, breaking down 
the job responsibility across the strategic, operational and tactical level. First, higher level  
commanders may not be the best qualified to manage the systems at the tactical levels. 
The experts are the individuals who have the proper training prior to and during 
deployment. Second, in seeking to meddle with the lower level decisions, commanders 
are wasting their valuable time, weakening the decision making skills of subordinates, 
and setting a poor precedent for future operations. Bigger issues that should be of their 
concern may be left unattended. Third, is the temptation and problems of 
micromanagement. The heightened situational awareness of strategic leaders, beneficial 
in many ways, has tempted them to direct operations at the lower levels of war by 
micromanaging tactical operations. Direct operational involvement by the highest levels 
of national command structure has historical precedent in the Falklands War and 
Operation Allied Force (Kosovo), among others. However, it has been observed that a 
highly  centralized command and control structure stifles initiative. In a report to 
Congress on the Iraqi command and control system it was reported that “A rigid top 
down C2 system” resulted in “a reluctance of Iraqi commanders to exercise initiative.” 
(Keeter, 2003) If the current trend of micromanagement in the political-military domain 
continues unchecked, a generation of leaders who are incapable of making independent 
decisions may be developed. 
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3. The Middle Way 
 Both views of NCW seem to characterize command and control in network 
centric system as an either/or proposition – centralized or decentralized, when in fact both 
methods of C2 will likely be accommodated. Joint Vision 2010 addresses this potential:  
It is important to acknowledge the merit of argument in both side 
(centralization vis-à-vis decentralization), and explore the balance through 
continuous experimentation and …. , and of course, situational. 
 The key to successful command and control is to maximize its benefits while 
eradicating the potential pitfalls. The modus operandi of the various services  shows that 
indeed the degree of centralization (of command) and de-centralization (of execution) is 
very much dependent on the scenario and nature of the operations. NCW has increased 
the span of our options, increased empowerment or autonomy at one end, and greater 
central oversight at the other end. Command and control should thus remain flexible and 
adaptive, and the merits of either be determined judiciously based on improving overall 
battle orchestration, resource optimization,  the speed of command and combat 
effectiveness of empowerment, while minimizing the ill effects of micromanagement. 
The followings list some potential pitfalls that we must safeguard ourselves against:   
a. Over-Centralization 
To ensure that network centric systems do not lead to overly centralized 
command structures, a three-pronged approach may be taken. (Schroeder, 2001). First, 
organizations must be structured to handle the amount of information that will be 
received. Exercises provide the practical experience to command network centric systems 
and allow the commander and his staff to become comfortable and familiar with 
emerging technology. This familiarity reinforces each member’s role in the organization 
and breeds the trust of his commander that he will be able to carry out his duties. The 
second prong of the effort rests with doctrine. Doctrine must first recognize that the 
operational commander will have more situational awareness of the battlefield than ever 
before. It must also recognize that the shooters and sensors in the field still remain the 
most qualified and best trained to carry out the mission. Doctrine for C2 under NCW 
must define the role and limits of control of each actor (decision maker, shooter and 
sensor). With defined roles, each actor is free to operate and accomplish their specific 
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tasks for which they were trained.  The third and final effort rests in effecting change in 
the human behavior of the commander and is linked inextricably to the first two points. 
Before a commander willingly delegates control to his subordinates, he must be 
comfortable with the new technology and volumes of information. Personality will 
always play a major role in how a commander elects to command but this can be shaped 
through training and exercises to work more efficiently in network-centric systems.   
b.  Laissez Faire 
While enhanced awareness will allow greater autonomy and 
empowerment at the lower echelons, it does not replace the need for a good 
understanding of the commander’s intent. While some proponents of de-centralization 
argued that the enabler of increased speed of command is self-synchronization, and to 
that extent plans suffice to be just broad statements. In the interest of compressed time 
execution, the complete plans may at times not be available right at the start of the 
mission. These include final targets which can be effectively relayed en-route as long as 
sufficient details and time is available for the refinement of the initial plan by the 
combatant.  However, eradicating the need for a good plan is wishful thinking if not 
courting disaster. In order to help combatants compress the planning and re-assessment 
process, a clear commanders’ statement of intention and a comprehensive contingency 
plan may in fact be essential to ensure clear understanding of commander’s intent, 
common mindset, and unity of efforts.     
c.  Avoiding Micromanagement 
While every single tactical action may be increasingly scrutinized, not 
every tactical action has strategic ramifications. An approach can be developed to prevent 
the leadership from spending inordinate amounts of time observing tactical operations. 
Some recommendations are as follows:  
(1) Boundary of Responsibility. While enhanced awareness has 
brought about the coalescing of the strategic, operational, and tactical domains, due to 
human limitation in the span of control and the complex nature of warfare, the 
responsibility boundary of the various levels of war must be recognized and understood. 
The benefits of collaborative decision making might make it unnecessary to institute rigid 
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guidelines. However, recognition of the bounds will keep the focus of the commanders at 
the various levels in check.  
(2) Commander’s Intent and information flow. The 
understanding of commander’s intent is crucial in the cohesion of forces and unity of 
efforts.  While more detailed planning requirements for the lower echelons can be 
eliminated by the higher level in view of shared and enhanced situational awareness on 
the ground, the contingency planning reflective of the commander’s intent must be more 
comprehensive. This will better synchronize the troops’ actions with the higher 
commander, and in return invite less meddling from the top. Essentially, information 
must not only flow up, in the form of progress update from the lower echelons, but it 
must also be disseminated downwards, in the form of changes in commander’s intent.   
(3) Training. Training is essential to attain competency and 
trust at and among the various levels. Traditionally, training has been focused at the 
individual and combat entity level to hone individual and combat unit skills. Increasingly, 
systems level training is more important as NCW is about fighting war at the system 
level. Familiarity, competency and trust must be established at fighting war at the 
systems level, so that commanders are less apprehensive and less prone to being control 
freaks.  
E. ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL 
1. A Perspective from the A2C2 Program  
Circumventing the debate on centralization versus decentralization and  
networked versus hierarchy, the Adaptive Architecture for Command and Control 
(A2C2) research program focuses on situational and adaptive organizational modeling. 
The organizational modeling  involves a 3-phase design process (Kleinman et al., 2001). 
See Figure 2. 
The design process is dovetailed by an optimization algorithm involving an array 
of organizational measures comprising aggregated and dynamic measures, performance 
measures and measures of congruence. These measures consider variables such as 
platform processing and travel time, number of co-ordination and information exchange 
tasks, and performance of organization as related to task processing and decision-maker 
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co-ordination. In addition, a methodology was also incorporated to take account of  













































Figure 2.   Three Phase  Organizational Design Process (From: Kleinman, D.L., Levchuk, 
G.M., Meirina, C., Pattipati, K.R. 2001. “Design & Analysis of Robust and 
Adaptive Organization”) 
The above robust and adaptive organization modeling and design is probably the 
most comprehensive of its kind to-date. Its practical value is yet to be fully established. 
Nevertheless, the design could serve as a preliminary guide especially when used 
together with a thorough analysis of human behavior in organization.  
2. A Perspective from Organizational Theory 
Based on organizational theory, the objective of strategic organizational design is 
to obtain total design fit, namely, situational fit, contingency fit, and design parameter fit. 
Situational fit concerns management style, size, environment, technology and strategy. 
Contingency fit ensures that contingency relations - if-then statements - have been 
followed and are compatible with each other. Design parameter fit considers the 
compatibility of the design recommendations on configuration, formalization, 
centralization, co-ordination and control, and so on. This approach yields a list of design 
guidelines and consideration for our C2 organization design. (Burton & Obel, 1995). 
F. SUMMARY 
Digital networking allows forces to develop speed of command, increase 
battlespace awareness through the proliferation of COP, and increase combat power. This 
NCW approach to warfare could draw the C2 organizations towards two opposing 
directions. On one hand, greater centralization could be a natural consequence, as the fog 
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and friction of war is dramatically reduced, and the compression of time and space bring 
remote control closer to reality. On the other hand, similar improvement in awareness of 
ground units permit them to exercise greater initiative to self-synchronize with the higher 
operational goals with reduced directives. The traditionally hierarchical, service 
stovepiped, and general conservatism of military organization also imposes impediments 
to harness the full benefits of a networked environment. A balanced and pragmatic 
approach must be taken, one that leverages on network technology to achieve greater 
combat prowess through initiatives, and increased speed of command, while at the same 
time instituting safeguards to avoid pitfalls such as micromanagement, laissez faire C2 
and over-centralization. A flexible and adaptive C2 organization, coupled with a flattened 
hierarchical structure, remain the best basis for continued experimentation and evolution 
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IV.  C2 PROCESS AND DOCTRINE 
A.  COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCESS 
Command and control serves to provide the decision maker the required 
information, and facilitate situation assessment, planning and execution.  The procedure 
employed by a commander to effect command and control is termed the Command and 
Control Process or the C2 Process. In contemporary practice, the C2 process is usually 
helmed by an operational headquarters (with its decision  makers) and often serves a 
number of functions/roles (Hayes, 2003), namely:  
a. Converts policy (guidelines for action) into military directives and ensures 
that policies are not violated within the theatre. 
b. Maintains an assessment of the current military situation 
c. Develops strategy and plans  
d. Communicates the plans to subordinate commands and ensures co-
ordinated actions by those commands 
e. Studies beyond the current situation and planning horizon to foresee 
emerging requirements for the future.  
f. Executes strategic operations such as psychological warfare.  
g. Provides a variety of expertise services such as technical and 
administrative.     
In serving the above roles/functions in an environment clouded with fog and 
friction of war, C2 process is inherently designed with due emphasis to ensure accuracy 
in the passing of command orders, so as to minimize making big mistakes,  safeguard 
against fratricide, as well as achieving optimal cohesion, effectiveness and economies of 
force. (Alberts et al., 1999).    
There are at least three representative models of the C2 process, namely, the 
Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Loop, the Lawson -Moose Cycle and the 
Headquarters Effectiveness Assessment Tool (HEAT) process.  All of these models 
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include semblances of sensing, fusing, understanding, deciding, conveying the decisions, 
and acting (execution) as part of the C2 cycle.   
1. The OODA Loop 
Probably the simplest and best known C2 model, the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act 
or OODA loop is attributed to Col John Boyd, USAF, Retired (Figure 3). This model is  
derived largely from his experience in tactical warfighting as a fighter pilot in the Korean 
War, but it serves as a good basic model for the C2 process.  Colonel Boyd wrote: 
“The process of observation-orientation-decision-action represents what takes 
place during the command and control process—which means that the O-O-D-A 
loop can be thought of as being the C&C [Command & Control] loop … 
Operating inside [the] adversary’s O-O-D-A loop means the same thing as 
operating inside [the] adversary’s C&C loop.” 
 
 
Figure 3.   The OODA Loop (From: Kenneth C. Allard. 1990. Command, Control and the 
Common Defense [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press]) 
 
Accordingly to Col Boyd, the objective of C2 is to operate within the enemy’s 
OODA/C2 loop by thinking more quickly and coherently. In doing so, one can 
complicate the enemy’s decision cycle, deny him options as it is being developed, thus 
complicating and eventually leading to the collapse of the opponents C2 cycle, and his 
defeat. Col Boyd postulated that the C2 cycle is an organic process rather than explicit 
internal arrangement since much of the loop takes place within the brain of the human. 
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For that, the model fails to adequately explain all of the command and control activities 
occurring in the more sophisticate C2 occurring at all levels today.    
2. The Lawson-Moose Cycle 
The Lawson-Moose cycle is a more detailed C2 model and premised upon the 
notion that “ the purpose of command and control is to either maintain or change the 
surrounding environment.”. (Hughes, 1986).  
 
Figure 4.   The Lawson-Moose Cycle (From: CAPT Wayne P. Hughes Jr., USN, Retired. 
1986. Fleet Tactics [Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press]) 
 
The Lawson-Moose Cycle consists of five-steps, namely, sense, process, 
compare, decide and act (see Figure 4). Rather then a single ‘Observe’ block, Lawson 
expanded it into “sense” and “process” steps. These more discrete steps become useful as 
the C2 process moves away from something that happens within a single brain, to a more 
distributed process that encompasses multiple sensors producing data that must be turned 
into actionable knowledge.  
Another feature of the Lawson-Moose cycle is the “desired state” that represents 
the overall objective of the process and the “compare” step.  The “desired state” block 
can include such items as the commander’s intent, essential tasks, the mission statement, 
or the operations order. The “compare” step (similar to the OODA Loop’s “orient” block) 
examines the current state of the environment against the desired state. This enables the 
commander to “decide” on the appropriate courses of action that he believes will change 
the environment to his advantage and amplify the commanders’ desire to influence its 
environment, an element not apparent in the OODA loop.  
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3. The HEAT Process 
Perhaps the most contemporary amongst the C2 models, the Headquarters 
Effectiveness Assessment Tool (HEAT) process was developed by Dr. Richard E Hayes 
and others at Defense Systems, Inc., in 1984 (now known as  Evidence Based Research  
Inc.). It consists of monitor, understand, develop alternative actions, predict, decide, and 
direct steps as depicted in Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5.   The Headquarters Effectiveness Assessment Tool (HEAT) Process (From: John 
E. Kirzl. 1999. Command and Control Evaluation in the Information Age.)     
The C2 Process was viewed as an adaptive control system seeking to attain 
control over its environment. In order to be effective, this control system must monitor its 
environment, develop an understanding as to what is happening, develop and assess 
course of action to control the environment, predict the consequences of selecting a 
course of action, decide on a course of action, develop a plan, and provide direction to 
subordinates, and then monitor progress. In a military situation, the environment consists 
of friendly, enemy and neutral forces (including non-combatants), terrain, and weather, 
all in the context of the mission to be performed. This process mirrors more closely the 
institutionalized C2 procedures in today’s military organizations, while the earlier models 
provide a more intuitive and basic framework of the C2 process.      
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B. THE CURRENT APPROACH   
Traditionally, the C2 process has been characterized by an iterative sequential 
series of steps. These decision or C2 processes exist at various echelons and subordinate 
loops are embedded accordingly. The speed of the loops is driven by the demand of the 
highest hierarchy but is in turn constrained by the pace of operations across the entire 
organization. Typically, the highest operational headquarters will dictate a C2 process 
through the promulgation of a standardized wartime procedure which will detail the 
various steps and the timeframe. Such a typical war procedure of the U.S. Army is shown 
in the figure below.  
 
 
Figure 6.   Army’s Decision-Making Cycle (From: U.S. Army Filed Manual “ The Infantry 
Battalion”. FM7-20) 
 
The current approach to developing a military campaign plan is thus predicated 
upon a fairly well understood set of relationships among events that take time to unfold. 
As shown above, the process can be decomposed into a series of steps, each one building 
on the preceding steps. With each activity executed sequentially, over time,  activities at 
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each of the echelons become compartmentalized and highly structured. This process  has 
evolved to the extent that planning and execution could be quite distinct activities, with 
one level executing the existing plan while another developing the new plan. In addition, 
this process operates in a cyclical manner.  For example, an Air Force can typically 
operate say about 4 day and 2 night mission windows, depending on the ability to 
generate combat power. The C2 cycle will then operate within each of these operating 
windows. In the U.S. Air Force, this cyclic arrangement is further facilitated by means of 
an Air Tasking Order (ATO) which goes out from a single centralized location to all 
subordinate units once every 24 hours (or perhaps some shorter period). Each of these 
ATO takes between 48 and 72 hours to generate, so several are in preparation at the same 
time. 
This current approach to C2 lacks flexibility as each cycle and the associated 
activities are locked into a fixed timeframe. Each event has to be completed before 
another event begins. Information that could not meet the earlier cycle will fall into the 
next C2 cycle. This omits the importance of time sensitive information, synergy and 
integration of the various activities and events. Combat power and sometimes critical 
opportunities may be lost as a result. The highly structured procedure and process  
provide a systematic approach to an otherwise complex task by breaking down the task  
to more manageable building blocks.  
C. THE EVOLUTION OF C2 PROCESS       
The emergence of NCW is revolutionizing the C2 process. First, it compresses the 
execution of the C2 process in the time domain. Second, it is merging the current discrete 
and largely separate planning and execution processes. Third, it is harnessing greater 
flexibility through self-synchronization.  
1.  Time Compression  
This is the most direct and apparent impact of information technology. The 
communication intermediaries of couriers and runners had given way to a seamless 
global communications grid with increasingly larger bandwidth. The speed of  
communication is no longer hampered by the physical limitations of the couriers and 
runners to traverse geographical distance, but rather facilitated by digital communications 
technology that could go round the earth many times within the wink of an eye. This has 
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dramatically compressed the C2 cycle. The entire C2 cycle is more responsive to the 
environment due to the shorter decision loop. As a result, combat effectiveness is gained 
as the lapse between desired effects and execution is reduced, minimizing the loss in 
combat power /effects.  
The time compression of the C2 cycle of both opposing forces also means that the 
pace of warfare is intensified. Warfare is happening as fast as the information flows. This 
could mean greater and overwhelming workload in processing the information, especially 
without effective information management tools.  
2. Collaborative Planning and Execution 
The three primary C2 functions of Decision-making, Battlespace Visualization 
and Management can be depicted as a set of spheres (See Fig. 7). Monitoring and 
understandings of the situation are located in the Battlespace Visualization sphere, 
alternative courses of action, predictions, decisions, and plan development are parts of the 
Decision Making sphere, and direct, disseminate and execute are in the Battle 
Management sphere, with information providing a linking mechanism between the 
spheres.  
 
Figure 7.   C2 Functional Spheres (From: John E. Kirzl. 1999. “Command and Control 
Evaluation in the Information Age”.)     
 
 Dr. Hayes suggested that as the information and networking grids mature, 
information will become ubiquitously available to all levels simultaneously. (Kirlz, 
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1999). This will result in the three functional spheres coming closer together, creating 
interesting conjunctions and intersections (See Fig 8).     
 
Figure 8.   C2 Functional spheres linked by Information (From: John E. Kirzl. 1999. 
“Command and Control Evaluation in the Information Age”.) 
As a result of the mutual awareness between Battle Visualization (planning) and 
Battle Management (execution) domains, both activities no longer need to be conducted 
discretely and separately. Instantaneous feedback is possible as planners can ‘watch’ the 
effects of their plans and immediately reflect the new battlespace situation in their  
planning. The activities no longer need to be segregated due to the arduousness and 
sophistication in gathering the information and understanding the situation.  The potential 
benefit is the greater synergy of efforts from planning to execution, and greater 
responsiveness of the plans to the actual situation on the ground.  A benefit of the  
merging planning and execution process is the reach back capability. Aided by the 
communications technology, targeting information no longer needs to be available to the 
combatant at the point of initiating the mission, but rather provided at a later time when 
plans catch up with the execution cycle or when more updated information is available. 
This further compresses the C2 cycle and makes the plans even more responsive to actual 
ground situation.     
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3. Harnessing Greater Flexibility   
Given the common battlespace awareness across the three domains, decisions in 
an network centric environment can be generated in different domains depending upon 
the nature of the decision. Complex decisions, requiring complicated and thorough 
analyses of courses of action and available options, continue to be parts of the Decision 
Making sphere. Contingent, or simple, decisions, which are those requiring only that the 
commander (staff) understand that the situation matches a planned contingency, occur at 
the intersection of the Battlespace Visualization and Battle Management spheres. The 
reduction of uncertainty resulting from the vast improvements in information availability 
will allow many previously complex and/or contingent decisions to be automatable 
decisions (e.g., target/weapon pairing). They occur at the intersection of the three spheres 
and are characterized as rapid, pre-planned, and requiring no human intervention. This  
allows the operational headquarters to focus on higher level decisions, and provides the 
freedom of the lower echelons to act with the improved situational picture. This expedites 
the C2 process by reducing the planning requirements at the higher echelons while 
enhancing the execution by having the decision done at the level where it can be done 
most efficiently. 
NCW provides new opportunities to improve the highly structured and 
institutionalized C2 processes that we are accustomed to. These opportunities come about 
as communications speed has increased manifolds, and networking has enabled  common 
awareness and more knowledgeable combatants along the C2 chain. These opportunities 
are manifested in the time –compressed C2 cycle, collaborative planning and execution, 
enhanced flexibility and self-synchronization attributes in operations. The C2 process 
must be revamped to exploit these opportunities. Several things ought to be done: 
a. Reassessment of the timeframe of previous events/activities.  
b. Identification of the ‘automatable’ decisions, new framework of tactical 
and operational decisions, as well as new planning requirements at headquarters. 
c. Planning and treating C2 more of a continuum inextricably linked with 
execution, rather than a start-and-stop activity of a fixed period. 
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D.  C2 DOCTRINE    
With new ways of operation, changes would certainly be required in the 
operational doctrines. There are several levels of doctrine, the highest level and the most 
enduring of which are the principles of war. In the U.S. doctrine (US JCS, 1991), the 
principles of war comprises Mass, Objective, Offensive, Security, Economy of force, 
Maneuver, Unity of Command, Surprise and Simplicity. While these principles remain 
largely relevant, new interpretations are necessary where the essence of NCW brings 
about new meaning to the status quo.  
Lavee en Masse has provided the ultimate answer to the principle of Mass since 
the Napoleonic era. However, in NCW, it is no longer sufficient to interpret Mass as 
singularly predicated on human soldiers/weapons. In platform-centric attrition-based 
warfare, fire power is effected through the massing of forces. In network centric effect-
based warfare, such is not necessary, though important. The geographical gap can be 
bridged by moving information to allow dispersed forces to deliver devastating and 
massive effects on a common location, and target. In fact, in NCW, the massing of effects 
results in a smaller footprint of the operations, as it may not require the massing of forces 
physically, or at least not to the same extent. This not only increases survivability of the 
forces, but also imbues greater flexibility in the conduct of the operation.  
“Unity of Command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander 
for every objective.”. (U.S. JSC, 1995).   Unity of effort remains the ultimate objective to 
achieve synergy of efforts. However, increasingly, the existence of unity of command in 
an increasingly well-informed network and dynamic situation, may not be the imperative.  
Nevertheless, a laissez faire scenario of autonomous ground forces self-synchronizing 
towards the command objective may remain a distant dream.   
Security will remain increasingly sophisticated and susceptible to attacks on the 
networking grids. Unlike previously when most information was compiled at the higher 
headquarters and compartmentalized at the lower echelons, the knowledgeable combatant 
of NCW requires that information also be sent to the ground forces. The security of the 
networking grid and its freedom of use will increasingly be the backbone and enabler of 
NCW, and hence subject to more sophisticated attacks and counter-counter operations.  
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Simplicity is critical in ensuring complete understanding and ease of execution, 
especially in the midst of the fog and friction of war. With the vision of NCW clearing 
the fog and friction of war at least to a certain extent, increasingly more complicated 
operations may be possible, if information dominance is achieved. Spurred by the general 
public’s over–expectation of military capability and the humanistic concerns fed by the 
media, combat forces will have to contend with the adverse effects of the media by 
painstakingly showing that only appropriate force are used and collateral damages  
minimized.  
At the lower levels of operational doctrine, more extensive changes would be 
expected. However, this doctrine will be premised on the new concept of operations in 
the new information paradigms, many of which are still in development. Such doctrine 
will have to be continually evolved through operational and experimental exercises, as 
well as actual operational experiences.   
E. SUMMARY 
In military operations, the C2 process is a critical part in the waging of campaigns 
and fighting of battles. The emergence of NCW is deemed to revolutionize this otherwise 
extensively institutionalized and well-oiled process. The highly structured process needs 
to incorporate the new opportunities arisen from NCW, such as a compressed C2 cycle, 
collaborative planning and execution, and greater flexibility through reach back and self-
synchronization capabilities. The mindset of a cyclical and mutually exclusive process 
must be replaced by one of a continuous and overlapping continuum of planning and 
execution. The exploitation of these new opportunities will harness increased yields in  
combat power.  
Changes in ways of conducting operations will inevitably induces changes to the 
operational doctrines. At the highest level of operational doctrine, the principles of war 
remain largely unchanged though new interpretation might have to be incorporated to 
reflect the new paradigms of NCW. At the lower levels of operational doctrine, changes 
will take place more extensively and evolve with the development of new NCW concepts 
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V.  C2 INFOSTRUCTURE AND SYSTEMS 
A. PURPOSE 
The C2 Infostructure and systems are the vital backbone and enabler of Network 
Centric Warfare. The C2 infostructure essentially refers to the information infrastructure 
comprising an integrated network of communications and computational links that 
provide the seamless connectivities among all its subscribers. The C2 systems here refer 
to the  applications, information management tools or computer subsystems that often 
ride on the infostructure to provide the information exchange and decision support 
functionalities used to facilitate the command and control process.   
 The C2 Infostructure and systems serve many purposes: 
a. Information Dissemination. First and foremost, it facilitates 
communications. Traditionally, C2 nodes pass information, including orders and 
instructions, through voice and fax. These are usually subject to human errors (e.g.,  
hearing the wrong message) and limitations such as, requiring the immediate attention of 
the receiving party, and suitable for short and simple information/instructions. For faxing, 
there can be substantial time lapse in transmitting the document depending on the length 
of the document. Increasingly, modern digital communications are employed for  
messaging, document and picture transfers, and in many cases, they replace the need for 
faxing and voice communications.   
b.  Information Management. With the deluge of information, the potential 
for information overload is real. As a value-added service, it is important for C2 systems 
to ensure that what is provided or received is actually information and not noise. 
Moreover, information should be organized according to their relevance to facilitate ease 
of retrieval. 
c. Knowledge and Decision Support. With the increasing pace of C2, the 
blazing speed of modern communications, and the expanding span of control,  
information needs to be quickly assimilated as knowledge to decide and  respond to the 
situation. At the same time, more decisions need to be made and quicker responses are 
demanded. Knowledge and Decision support need to be automated to at least ease the 
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workload for the processing of the more mundane, and simple information collation and 
decision-making. This will prevent decision-makers from being overwhelmed by the 
sheer volume of the information and tasks.      
d.  Automating Process.  Ideally, the processes should be built into the 
systems so that  the processes can take place most efficiently without the manual and 
unwarranted interruption of the human operator. This will reduce the learning process 
and workload in using the systems.  
B. INFOSTRUCTURE   
In essence, the NCW approach is about the moving of the right information very 
quickly, at the right time, and to the right place (assuming that information is correct and 
person has the knowledge to make the right decision). This information can be 
categorized into the following:  
a.  Battle Information. This encompasses all operational data and information 
regarding the conduct of the battle from mission schedules, ammunition availability, 
manpower status, to orders and battle plans.   
b. Tactical Coordination and Control. This entails all forms of realtime co-
ordination and control communications between combat entities on combat operations. 
This usually comprises complementary voice and messaging utilities, at least until voice 
communications becomes totally obsolete.  
c. Situational Awareness. In an NCW environment, situational awareness is 
facilitated by the dissemination of COPs. Battle knowledge is derived from this 
situational picture coupled with the battle information to provide commanders the 
premise for decision making.   
d.  Targeting/Engagement Information. Engagement quality information 
requirements are realtime targeting data to facilitate threat assessment, closure prediction, 
and distributed weapon-target assignment. This information,  derived from multiple 
sensors or a single most reliable source in the proximity of the target, usually consists of 
accurate  position/velocity and friend-and-foe identification. Such information enables 
precise engagement of adversary forces across the depth and breadth of battlespace with 
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not only the line-of-sight weapons in the threats’ immediate vicinity but also a wide 
spectrum of beyond line of sight weapons in the area of operations.    
Based on the information requirements, the future framework of the infostructure 
can be constructed in four grids according to the information categories. By and large, the 
categories will also streamline the link requirements based on the quality of service, 
particularly the link latency, data rate, error tolerance, and delivery confidence. These 
four grids1 are:    
1. Information Grid  
The information grid is an information highway, primarily among the command 
and control nodes. It serves the infrastructure to “receive, process, transport, store, protect 
and even value-add on information” among all its subscribers. Voice, data, and video can 
be transmitted, usually via broadcast mode in the majority of cases. It is a repository of 
all battle information such as orders, plans, and mission schedules. The grid provides 
access to a large volume of information with delay tolerance in the order of 
seconds/minutes.  
2. Tactical Control Grid  
The tactical control grid serves as a communication platform to provide realtime 
coordination and control among its tactical users and C2 centers. The information relayed 
can be voice, data, video transmitted via point-to-point or direct broadcast.  As the 
information relayed on this grid is highly perishable and time sensitive, it has low 
tolerance for transmission delays, usually in the order of sub-seconds.   
3. SA (or Situational Awareness) Grid 
The SA grid serves as the data pipe for sensor information and provides the users 
with situational awareness across the battlespace. This grid links all sensors in a 
battlespace and fuses the sensor data (primarily track information) to provide a more 
accurate and comprehensive battlespace picture. These sensors  may comprise air-, sea-, 
ground-, space-, and cyberspace-based sensors. They may be dedicated sensors, sensors 
                                                 
1 In much of the NCW literature (Alberts et al., 1999; Cebrowski, 1998), only three grids were 
suggested, namely information, sensor and targeting. I have included a tactical control grid which I 
perceive to be an important category that ought not to be subsumed into the information grid – the realtime 
requirement sets it apart from the majority of the information requirement. It must be noted, nevertheless, 
that the categorization is arbitrary and intends to provide a comprehensive conceptual framework. It is 
hence subjected to optimization during technical implementation, provided that the essence and utilization 
of the various grids and pertaining requirements are not compromised). 
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based on weapons platforms, sensors employed by individual soldiers, or embedded 
logistics sensors. Platform commanders are thus no longer limited to only the sensor data 
provided by their platform sensors, but have direct access to a common and 
comprehensive situational picture.  
 
 
Figure 9.    The Situational Awareness  (or Sensor) Grid. (From:  Stein, Fred P. 2003. 
"Observations on the Emergence of Network Centric Warfare". Evidence Based 
Research Inc. <http://www.dodccrp.org/steinncw.htm/>> [29 Oct 2003])   
Sensors and the SA grid can be both persistent and transient. In other words, they 
can both be dynamically assigned to support different mission requirements thus allowing 
optimal use of resources. The acceptable delay tolerance defers according to the battle 
arena. For situational awareness regarding the land troop or surface ship, typically delay 
tolerance in order of minutes  or seconds is not a problem. However, in air battle, the 
sensor data must be highly accurate and the delay tolerance should be below sub-second.  
4. Targeting/Engagement Grid  
The targeting/engagement grid allows subscriber access to any weapon systems in 
the battlespace. It links all weapon systems via the network and entails high-end network 
performance in terms of high data rate and very low latency information transport 
capabilities to achieve cooperative sensing and engagement of high speed targets. Sensor 
data may also be included, and usually when used for the purpose of targeting or 
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engagement, the data must be very accurate to provide the required engagement 
precision. For this reason, sensors are often integrated at the plot level. As with the SA 
grid, the targeting/engagement grid may be persistent or transient in nature, activated on a 
demand basis. Due to the low latency tolerance, the grid is however limited in its spatial 
distribution, and is usually for weapons/sensors within the immediate locality of the 
target.  
C. C2 SYSTEMS  
At the heart of command and control is a full spectrum of information 
management tools or command and control systems, that facilitate and aid decision-
making, disseminate orders and plans, control and execute missions, and monitor and 
supervise activities. Typically, the command and control systems will contain elements of 
Headquarters Battle Management Information Systems which provide commanders the 
‘global’ battle information needs,  Campaign/Mission Planning tools, Orders 
Dissemination and Mission Monitoring System, In-flight Command and Control systems 
for realtime tactical control, and etc. By virtue of the hierarchical organization, these  
systems used to be stove-piped along the functional divides. Hence, the first generation 
command and control systems in the modern computer age were generally  functionally 
oriented based on structured design technique (Fassbender & Stein, 2004). The 
proliferation of wireless communication systems using different protocols, the difficulty 
for coalition forces to communicate over such systems, and the difficulty of coordinating 
both police and fire activities on Sep 11 are examples of the present state of stovepipe 
systems, both military and civilian (Logan, Aug 2003). The realization of the synergy of 
information and the needs for integrated information tools at the various combat levels 
drove subsequent development towards the lateral integration of the stove-piped systems. 
This led to a “matrixed” systems development approach with stove-piped systems 
continuing to serve functional needs and new operational systems being customized to 
the needs at the lateral levels. This matrix construct resulted in highly complex and 
unwieldy integration of multiple systems which become too expensive to develop, 
modify and maintain. Today, the network and internet protocol usher in a new network -
based design orientation that eases the implementation of the command and control 
systems.  In addition, new facilities and tools are being introduced into the command and 
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control arena, from basic e-mailing and collaborative systems to increasingly 
sophisticated decision support modules.  
D.  AN HETEROGENOUS ARCHITECTURAL FRAMEWORK 
In an ever-changing and dynamic environment where we have little a priori 
knowledge of the foreseeable future and conflict, it has become important to establish a 
set of rules, guidance, and principles to align the development of future C2 systems in 
order to ensure mission-effective and expense efficient end-products. Such an 
architectural framework, known as “The Advanced Technology Architecture for 
Information Superiority (ATAIS)”  was conceived by the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA), U.S. DoD. While  ATAIS is not yet a complete architecture 
with a complete set of specifications,  it provides a strategy and overarching 
considerations for building future C2 infostructure and information systems.  
The  ATAIS is driven by two sets of important overarching requirements, namely, 
operational and technical (Hayes-Roth 2003). The driving operational requirements 
entail:  
a. Dynamic creation and employment of an information infrastructure 
suitable to support distributed cross-functional organizational elements for mission or 
task duration,  
b. Direct access to mission or task-related information independent of the 
user’s location, information source, and command structure,  
c. Continuous, consistent battlespace awareness, including execution 
monitoring and information collection management,  
d. Significant increases in speed of command, including predictive planning 
and reasoning with unstructured information,  
e. Self-synchronization of dispersed, disparately equipped, multilingual force 
elements based upon widespread understanding of the Commander’s Intent,  
f.  Rapid target recognition and attack, including dynamic sensor-weapon and 
weapon-target pairing, 
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g. Maintenance of Information Superiority through offensive and defensive 
Information Operations. 
The driving technical requirements specify the following considerations:  
a. Interoperability – the architecture must facilitate the interoperation 
between constituent systems, including those created in the future as well as those already 
deployed by the US and potential coalition partners. 
b. Composability – the architecture must facilitate the rapid creation of new 
applications and new processes in response to new missions and threats by allowing users 
to quickly compose off-the-shelf components in new ways, and easily modify and 
reconfigure systems and applications to meet changing missions and threats. 
c. Functional Integration – the architecture must support the integration of a 
large number of applications based on a common business process, achieving complete 
coverage of the process while minimizing duplicated effort and resources. 
d. Achievement of Global System Performance Characteristics – the 
architecture must facilitate the achievement of important global system performance 
characteristics including security, mobility, distributability, flexibility and adaptability, 
automation, robustness, reliability, scalability, and responsiveness.  Each of these 
characteristics should be attainable to the degree required to satisfy mission needs and 
achieve the commander’s intent.  Tradeoffs between global performance characteristics 
should be dynamically adjustable by the warfighters for a broad range of situations.     
The structure of ATAIS is depicted in Figure 10 below. It comprises three basic 
architectures: The Operational Architecture which represents the tasks and activities, 
operational elements, and information flows required to accomplish or support a military 
operation; the Technical Architecture which gives the minimal set of rules governing the 
arrangement, interaction, and interdependence of system elements to ensure that a 
conformant system satisfies its requirements; and the System Architecture which 
associates physical resources and their performance attributes to the operational 
architecture and its requirements per standards defined in the technical architecture.  The 
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hierarchy of Domain-Specific Software Architectures (DSSA) is the building block for 







































Figure 10.   ATAIS Structure (From: Hayes-Roth Frederick. Sep. 2003. “Architecture, 
Interoperability, and Information Superiority”).  
 
1. Operational Architecture 
The operational architecture essentially outlines the business process models of 
the organization.  It is critical to build-in the business processes so that the systems can 
follow the business rules without intervention from the human operator. This is unlike 
traditional C2 information systems that just automate a small piece of the entire task, 
instead of facilitating the entire process. The operational architecture also takes 
cognizance of the close-loop decision and execution cycle, the increasing 
reconfigurability and flexibility in team composition, and the fractal nature of control in 
the organization.        
2. Technical  Architecture 
The technical architecture propounds five guiding principles that minimally 
constrain system design. These are :  
a.  Achieve semantic interoperability using a Common Meta-Model. A 
common meta-model approach is the most promising way to achieve inter-operability to  
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large scale architecture-based development within a heterogeneous organization.  The 
semantics of an object comprises its states, the rules governing its behavior, and the 
meaning of its interfaces and capabilities. Thus semantically interoperable systems share 
common meaning and reduce the effort needed to develop interoperable systems. In 
comparison, interoperability design based on syntax compatibility exchanges data using 
agreed upon data formats and structures requires more substantial integration effort.  
 b. Support multiple levels of interoperability.  Having multiple levels of 
interoperability represents a practical solution to large organization whereby it is 
impractical to develop a comprehensive global object model shared throughout the 
organization. The levels  of interoperability – from systems that use a common database, 
to loosely interoperable message-based systems, to tightly integrated applications can be 
implemented using the same technical component frameworks. The level of specificity of 
their shared object model will determine the degree of interoperability between two 
systems.  
c.  Achieve composability by embracing Component Technology.  In 
order to achieve rapid application development, increase software reuse and allow less 
skilled operators and technicians to create applications, component technology ought to  
be embraced. Microsoft’s COM/DCOM/.NET, Sun’s Java Beans, the OMG’s CORBA, 
and the web services of OASIS/W3C are examples of technologies that support 
application composability. The development trend in this arena has been the 
standardization of component technologies and an understanding of proper development 
practices that facilitate reuse and interoperability.   
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d. Thoroughly Exploit Commercial Technology. The breathtaking pace of 
technological innovation in the commercial marketplace has created enormous 
opportunity to harness more cost-effective commercial solutions to achieve information 
superiority. However, the same technology is also available to our adversaries. Thus, we 
must continue to keep up with these commercial technologies and make best use of them, 
while at the same time focusing R&D resources on areas not addressed by the 
commercial market to deliver the silver bullets. In order to keep up with the pace of 
technology revolution in the commercial world, dramatic improvement must take place in 
the way military acquisition and project management are being done. Most important of 
all, there must be a paradigm shift in the timeframe of such processes. Otherwise, the 
time when we ushered in a new system might just be the time it becomes obsolete in the 
commercial world. 
e. Embrace Heterogeneity while Promoting Standards.  To build 
advanced applications, system implementers must be able to choose from the best 
available solutions.  On this premise, a heterogeneous approach must be taken to 
implement IT systems. On the other hand, the use of well-defined interfaces and adoption 
of open standards are also crucial for achieving interoperability and composability. Thus,  
the military should stay open to the competing technologies, specifications, and standards 
while promoting standardization when the technology reaches maturity.  
The Boeing Company, similarly, outlined a technical architectural framework that 
they called Strategic Architecture Reference Model (SARM) to facilitate Network 
Centric Operations. It is worthy to note that while Boeing premised their technical 
approach upon standards, particularly Internet Protocol, the U.S. DoD advocated an 
heterogeneous approach. The U.S. DoD advocated consolidating established standards 
through an evolutionary and market survivability concept instead of putting the bet 
essentially on just one horse. The Boeing approach, on the other hand, adhered to a 
common interface and functionally and common ontology. It is a more simplistic model 
and may be suitable for smaller Armed Forces. The caveat is that the approach locked 
itself onto a particular technology. It has to hence continually be alert and agile to 
technological changes.     
E.  OPERATIONALIZATION  
In ushering in new systems and operationalizing the systems’ capabilities, there 
are a number of pitfalls or myths that organizations must try to avoid.      
a.  The Myth of “Shorter Learning Curve”. This is only a half truth, at best. It 
may be true that with computer literary continuing to rise, and commonly established 
human-machine interface norms becoming more intuitive, the learning curve for the 
‘keyboard activities’ and navigational functionalities of application programs is 
shortened. However, this simplistic observation runs the risk of rendering the significance 
of the automated backend work processes into oblivion. The emphasis of training should 
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shift from the ‘keyboard’ activities to the mechanism and workflow of the processes. 
Organizations that trivialize training as a result of the advent of ‘smarter’ systems must 
bear the risk of being eventually driven by the process and not being able to take charge 
of it in the long run.    
b. New Tools require New Rules. A primary finding from  “Bridge to Global 
’99” was that the proliferation of new information systems and tools requires a brand new 
set of rules, protocols, and guidelines-for-use to help teams understand when and how 
best to use them (Kemple, 1999). Given our traditional use of audio communications as a 
primary means of coordination, the developed protocols and methods may no longer be 
the best fit for the new, network-based collaborative tools. We need to better harness the 
benefits of these new systems and minimize their ills. Thus, it would be useful to evolve 
new usage guidelines for email, chat, videoconferencing, shared graphics spaces (i.e. 
whiteboards and common map displays) and other network communication tools aimed 
at harnessing the optimal benefits of these new tools The guidelines should aim to shorten 
the learning time for new tools, without stifling any creative usage of the tools for  
operational gains.   
c. The misperception of information.  As a result of greater information 
flow and continuous update, there is a perception that every combatant will have access 
to all possible information, and will therefore be constantly “situationally aware.” 
(Kemple, 1999). This misperception can be hazardous, For instance, it could lead to false 
expectation, resulting from belief that others know things that they do not. It could also 
result in unproductive information dissemination caused by individuals pushing 
unintelligible data to others assuming that by doing so, the responsibility of informing 
others was fulfilled. Information assimilation is not just a simple process associated with 
the ‘cc’ function in e-mailing, but is an involved process of information filtering, fusion, 
storage and retrieval.  
F. SUMMARY 
  The Command and Control infostructure and systems suite is a critical enabler for 
Network Centric Warfare.  A cogent and visionary architectural framework must be in 
place to guide the development of the command and control systems to be mission 
effective and effort efficient. In ushering in the new systems, we may need new ways of 
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operating and should take cognizance of some of the lessons learned in our preliminary 
experiences with these new systems. 




















VI.  THE ROADMAP TO NCW 
A. KEY SUCCESS FACTORS 
To make Network Centric Warfare a reality, a number of conditions or key 
success factors must exist in the organization. These include aligning the organization’s 
commitment, resources and efforts, fostering a learning and innovative culture, 
constructing a seamless, robust and secured infostructure, and establishing measurement 
of effectiveness or performance of NCW.   
1. Organizational Alignment 
Like any change management, and more so for one which is so complex and 
laden with so many uncertainties, organization alignment is critically important in 
moving the organization to its desired state. First and foremost, there must be an 
alignment of attitudes.  The commitment of the leadership and the buying-in of 
commanders and all the men and women across the entire hierarchy is the bedrock for a 
successful transition.  Not only should this commitment be articulated, but it must be 
institutionalized because the transformation from platform-centric to network-centric 
warfare is a long haul, it is a journey meant for the marathoner, not the sprinter. Second, 
there must be an alignment of the resources and efforts. Archetypes of such alignment are  
investment strategy, research program, long term capabilities plan, and all the  related 
processes. Without optimizing resources and efforts, wastages and confusion may result 
in a loss of focus, leading to a failure not of the vision, but the implementation.  
2. A Learning and Innovative Culture 
 The only constant in a dynamic and rapidly changing world is change itself. The 
end-state of NCW remains visionary, and many researchers admit that we may  only be at 
the beginning of a revolution. Fostering a learning and innovative climate is thus essential 
in capturing creative new ways of meeting our mission objectives.  Old mind sets and 
operating models must be discarded and replaced by the new realities of NCW. The 
pillars of a learning organization outlined in Peter Senge’s Fifth Discipline (Senge, 1990), 
namely, system thinking, personal mastery, mental models, building shared visions, and 
team learning must be cultivated to continually expand an organization’s (and all its 
individuals’) capacity to learn, nurture collective aspiration, and create results truly 
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desired.  Our success in NCW transformation will not only depend on technology 
advancement, but in fact, more importantly on our ability to conceive, experiment with, 
and implement new network-centric ways of doing business that leverage the power of 
Information Age concepts and technologies, and transform them into new capabilities 
that NCW promises.  
3. Entry Fee 
 Infostructure is the entry fee to NCW. An infostructure that is secure, robustly 
networked, seamless, and coherent will enable NCW, facilitating network-centric 
learning and operations. Without a seamless, robust and secured infostructure, network 
centric operations cannot take place optimally, and in fact, the network susceptibility and 
vulnerability may compromise our mission more than value-adding. The upfront 
investment in extensive and robust networking is thus inevitable and critical. An 
infostructure architecture framework and implementation strategy must be established 
upfront in order to maximize standardization and reusability of components, and 
determine the most cost–effective solution.  In exercising financial prudence, it is  
important not to be ‘penny wise and pound foolish’. Systems requirements or ‘quality’ 
attributes’ must not be compromised in preference to meeting functional requirements. In 
order to harness innovation and rapidly advancing technology in the commercial sectors,  
open standards and off-the-shelf technology should be adopted as far as possible, but 
without compromising important systems level requirements.  
4. Co-evolutionary Development 
 The delivery of NCW capabilities does not rest singularly on technology. It would 
be far too simplistic to consider that everything is driven by a single factor, from which 
everything else evolves. The mutual influence and sophisticated interactions between the 
many factors mean that holding a single factor constant, and fine-tuning the other factors 
around it may be counter-productive. Development of NCW must be considered 
holistically as a co-evolution of technology (Material), organization, and process 
(Doctrine, and also Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) (Cebrowski, 1999) in order to 
achieve dramatic improvement in our warfighting effectiveness.  This is what transpired 
as the disruptive innovations of Blitzkrieg and Carrier Aviation matured from concept to 
reality.  
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5. Measures of Effectiveness/Performance (MoE/MoP) 
 There is a saying that goes ‘Performance that cannot be measured, will not be 
achieved’. In today’s corporate culture, where the management objectives are specified in 
numbers, whatever cannot be specified will fall outside the realm of top priorities and 
many a times reduced to rhetoric. Only when the attributes of performance and 
effectiveness can be measured, will organizations be able to track progress, amass 
organizational resources more optimally, and instill organizational discipline to stay the 
course for the long haul.  However, the search for the holy grail of overall C2 MoE/MoP 
has been elusive.   
6. Incremental and Evolutionary Approaches 
The road towards NCW is a journey, it is for the long haul. We cannot specify the 
end-state in any greater detail than what we know of the technology and the environment 
today,  so we need an evolutionary approach to sharpen our vision as the environment 
changes and our concept crystallizes. It would be impractical to wait till only end of the 
journey to see the product. We must take a progressive approach to put up landmarks 
along our journey to act as lighthouses to steer our direction. We need to provide the 
incremental successes to invigorate the organization to continue its NCW pursuit.  
B. THE ROADMAP   
In implementing the first Revolutionary in Military Affairs (RMA) in the 21st 
century, we need to devise a roadmap. It will serve to identify the landmarks along the 
journey and a compass to continually prevent us from going astray. The following 
suggested steps for NCW roadmap are consolidated from the many literatures on NCW.  
1. Understanding and Appreciating NCW  
The most fundamental step towards implementing NCW organization–wide is to 
foster an organization-wide understanding and appreciation of the basic tenets of NCW, 
its basic concepts and expected benefits. The primary objective is to achieve corporate 
buy-in to the vision of NCW.  Rather than forcing people to adopt a new concept,  it 
would be more fruitful to get the basic ideas of NCW across to the people, and hopefully, 
they would embrace the concept. Even if it does not achieve total buy-in of the masses, 
the process would eradicate some impediments and encourage desirable emergent 
behaviors along the way. Moreover, only with more people who understand and 
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appreciate NCW, could  more thoughtful discussion  be generated about the subject. 
Given human nature and the sheer size and diversity of a military organization, it is 
inevitable that different enclaves may have different interpretation of the basic NCW 
ideas. An healthy competition of the different schools of ideas should in fact be 
encouraged so that better and more innovative ways of employing NCW can emerge 
consequently.  The publication of Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging 
Information Superiority by U.S. DoD CCRP (C4ISR Cooperative Research Program) is a 
step in this direction. The concluding paragraph of its Introduction reads (Alberts et al., 
1999): “Since successful adoption of NCW required a cultural change, it cannot be 
achieved without widespread discussion, debate, experimentation, and ultimately broad 
acceptance.  If this book stimulates and contributes to this process, it will have achieved 
its intended effect.”       
2. Establishing the Infostructure 
Networking the organization must be one of the first steps to kick-start the NCW 
efforts. An adequate infostructure, with a critical mass of connectivity and 
interoperability, is necessary to both support and promote information sharing and 
collaboration, and to enable new approaches to command and control. Connectivity is 
important. According to Metcalfe’s law, the potential value of a network is a function of 
the square of the number of nodes that are connected by the network. However, its 
importance cannot be over-emphasized. More connectivity may be a cost liability and 
maintenance nightmare if it is not targeted at where it delivers the combat prowess. 
Rather, ‘quality’ attributes - as opposed to functional - of the infostructure, for example, 
performance (real-timeliness), robustness and security are also critical. A network that 
has poor security attributes would render the forces susceptible to information attacks or 
exploitation. Poor reliability would frustrate the operators, and instead of encouraging 
network centric operations, it would in fact achieve the exact opposite.         
The development of the network should not be left to a state of lassie faire. It 
must be governed by a good implementation strategy to meet the demands and best 
deliver the benefits. The basic network grids are outlined in Chapter V.  Systems level 
optimization and standardization must prevail in order to maximize inter-operability, and 
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inter-operability considerations must have a strategic focus and not be sacrificed for near-
time considerations.     
3. Organizational Blueprint and Architectural Framework 
Establishing an organization’s architectural framework or blueprint for NCW is 
an essential next step towards NCW. The value of an architectural framework is that it 
provides a holistic methodology and the mechanisms to facilitate efficient and effective 
co-ordination processes, information flows, systems, and investments within the 
organization, thus helping to optimally align the organization’s resources to focus on the 
achievement of NCW benefits. The common framework for planning, defining, and 
integrating will serve as repository of information and tools for organizational wide 
implementation. It will promote inter-operability standards and resource sharing, 
minimize data collection burden, and focus creativity and innovation. It is more than just 
a vision statement. With reference to Architectural Standards (Percivall, 2002), an 
architectural framework that meets all the standards is a comprehensive working model 
that details the responsible organization, scope, processes, and standards.  There are a 
number of methodologies for creating an architectural framework. Probably the most 
renowned is the Zachman framework which provides a common context for 
understanding a complex structure. The CIO Council employed an expanded version of 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) model in developing the 
Federal Enterprise Architecture. The five-layered model (as shown in Fig 11) allows for 
organizing, planning, and building an integrated set of information and information 
technology architectures.  
There are a number of approaches in developing the Architecture Framework. 
Three of these approaches are outlined below (CIO Council, 1999) :  
a. Conventional Approach – A most comprehensive and holistic approach. 
For complex organization or target architecture, this approach may result in “paralysis by 
analysis”, and would require a substantial initial investment in time and dollars upfront 
before any results could be visible. 
b.  Segment Approach – An evolutionary approach that promotes the 
incremental development of architecture segments within a structured organizational  
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architecture framework. This approach focuses on the major value chain that cuts across 
functional areas of the organization. Contrary to stove-piped structure which focuses on 
development areas, the segment approach integrates laterally across the organization to 
deliver the desired organizational output.  
 
 
Figure 11.   NIST Enterprise Architecture Model (From: CIO Council. 1999. Federal 
Enterprise Architecture Framework.)  
 
 c.  Status Quo Approach – This is a business-as-usual approach. It provides 
an architecture framework for current process, without the drive to achieve increased 
optimization process and has no focus due to lack of vision of a desired state.  
The choice of the approach is critical to the success of developing an effective 
architectural framework for the organization. Given the complexity of military affairs, 
and the size of most military organization, the segment approach appears to be a prudent 
kick-start. But, in a way, this incremental approach is not the end-state by itself. It merely 
streamlines the initial development, which could merge at a more advanced stage with the 
conventional approach to establish a truly optimal architectural framework for the 
organization.   
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Chapter 7 is devoted to a more complete elaboration of architecting for NCW 
success. 
4. Research and Experimentation 
The creation of an environment that supports innovation and experimentation is 
necessary to advance the NCW operational concepts. A conducive experimentation 
climate must comprise a central responsible agency to drive and co-ordinate the 
experimentation activities, the facilities to perform or play out the experiments, an 
institutionalized methodology to capture the learning experience, as well as a culture that 
encourages innovation and creativity.  
The purpose of a central establishment is twin-fold. It must drive the focus of the 
NCW experimentation and research by setting both the near and long term goals. 
However, this must not stifle innovation and creativity. In that sense, its focus must be 
flexible and may gravitate based on experimentation or research outcome to where the 
promises are held. It must support both operationalization goals with fixed deliverables, 
as well as bold initiatives and innovative ideas which have higher failure but also higher 
potential gains.   
The experimentation facilities must have an open architecture and ultra-
configurability to incorporate new technologies and operational concepts. It must not be 
just based on the current command and control setup, and risk putting ourselves in the 
current operating mindset. It must stimulate new business rules, new ways of command 
and control, and new work flow.   
The experimentation methodology must be institutionalized to instill the 
discipline to extract lessons from the learning experience for the future. A closed-loop 
process must be established, else we may fall into the usual trap and failures of combat 
exercises, where the same lessons are re-learned year after year.  The figure below 
depicts the Mission Capability Package methodology employed in the U.S. Armed Forces 
(US DoD, 2001). It is designed to bring a concept from infancy to maturity as fielded 
capability through  the stages of concept development, concept refinement, and 
operational implementation. The process employs a series of analysis, modeling and 
simulation, demonstrations, experiments and exercises in a close-loop manner and 
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examines a wide range of factors such as organizations, CONOPS/doctrine, Command 





Figure 12.   Mission Capability Package Process (From: U.S. DoD. July, 2001. Network 
Centric Warfare - Report to Congress.)  
 
Culture is another critical element in conducting research and experimentation. 
Increasingly, NCW failures must be seen as a seed to fuel future success rather than as an 
end-state and a judgment by itself.  A culture which encourages the generation of new 
ideas and creativity is critical to the success of the revolutionary changes that NCW is 
deemed to bring about.   
5. Specifying and Measuring Performance 
It is paramount to establish measurable NCW goals, to determine the value of 
various NCW investments and implementations to achieve its goals, and to determine 
progress using specific and non-ambiguous means. Essentially, a close-looped feedback 
system like the TQM process must be established so that the investment and 
implementation focus can continuously be fine-tuned towards NCW objectives.  In 
measuring the NCW goals, one must differentiate between the functional requirements 
and the ‘quality’ or systems’ attributes which are the outcome desired at the end of the 
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value chain.  There are a number of methods or metrics for the evaluation of command 
and control found in some of the current literatures, a few of them are highlighted below:  
a.  Measures of Merit (Alberts et al.,1999) 
In the CCRP publication “Network Centric Warfare: Developing and 
Leveraging Information Superiority”, a ‘value-added’ approach using a set of Measures 
of Merit (MoM) was suggested. This approach evaluates the contribution of C2 to 
mission performance by counting and weighting conflict results with and without the 
specific C2 enhancement. The MoM comprises five basic levels of measures (See Figure 
12). At the first level, the performance of the C4ISR systems as federated into an 
infostructure is measured. This refers to the computation power and ability to transmit or 
distribute information, that is, connectivity and bandwidth. This level of measurement 
does not automatically translate into increased mission effectiveness. The other end of the 
measurement hierarchy is the measurement related directly to mission effectiveness or 
utility. For combat operations, common measures that have been employed have included 
attrition rates, FEBA movement, fratricide, leakage, and time to accomplish a given 
mission. A sixth level, Measures of Policy Effectiveness, was being contemplated. This 
level is intended to assess the contribution of a military operation that was part of a larger 
undertaking, such as Peace Operations. There may indeed be cases where “successful” 
military operations are not sufficient to achieve policy objectives. In these cases it is 
important to understand the limits of military power.  
 
Figure 13.   Hierarchy of Measures of Merit (From: Alberts, D.S., Garstka, J.J. & Stein, F.P. 
1999. Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information 
Superiority. 2nd Edition. CCRP. )  
65 
 Bjorklund noted in an earlier book (Bjorklund, 1995) on a similar approach that 
while such approach does not address the tempo and uncertainty attributes in winning or 
losing war, it does provide an insight into the quality of the decision process, and provide 
alternative options and improvements to the C2 processes.  
b.  Headquarters Effectiveness Assessment Tool (Hayes, 1999)  
As its name implies, the Headquarters Effectiveness Assessment Tool 
(HEAT) is a method for evaluating the C2 effectiveness of a headquarters through its 
reactions to a changing warfare environment. HEAT assesses the overall effectiveness of 
decisions made and their implementation by subordinate headquarters by evaluating the 
various aspects of command and control, namely, the quality of the processes and the 
systems that support the processes, the quality of plans generated, and the quality of the 
directives issued to the forces to fulfill the plans. (Bjorklund, 1995). Like Alberts’ MoM, 
HEAT serves as a good tool for evaluating incremental changes in C2 systems and 
‘before-and-after’ training. However, it does not support ‘two-sided wargaming’ and 
hence is unable to assess the ability of commander and his staff in coping with 
uncertainty and battle tempo.  
c. NATO Hierarchy for Metrics (Clark, 1999) 
In Thea Cleark and Terry Moon’s paper “Assessing the Military Worth of 
C4ISR”, a hierarchy of metrics from the NATO Code of Best Practice [AC/243, 1999] 
was outlined. The metrics were adapted from the analysis framework,  Modular 
Command and Control Evaluation Structure (MCES), developed through a series of 
MoM workshops sponsored by the Military Operations Research Society (MORS) for the 
measurement of performance and effectiveness within a conceptual model for C2 (Sweet, 
R. et al., 1985). Within MCES framework, MORS has developed a four-level hierarchy 
of measures comprising:  
i. Measures of Force Effectiveness (MoFE)  which focus on how a force 
performs its mission or the degree to which it meets its objectives. Prime 
examples are force and exchange (relative force losses) ratios. 
ii. Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) which focus on the impact of C4ISR 
systems within an operational context. Examples could include communications 
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survivability and resistance to countermeasures, ability to formulate and distribute 
plans or create a common operating picture. 
iii. Measures of Performance (MoP) focusing on internal C4ISR system 
structure,  characteristics and behavior. Examples would include sensor spatial 
coverage, network loading, target tracking and delays. 
iv. Dimensional Parameters (DP) measure the properties or characteristics 
inherent in the physical C2 systems. Examples include bandwidth, signal to noise 
ratios, scan rate and field of view for sensors. 
This hierarchy for metrics focuses essentially at the performance of command and 
control  systems in terms of the system’s ability to generate or collate information and 
provide it to the end-user in a timely manner.   It offers a broad construct for developing 
approaches to measuring the worth of information in military operations and hence can 
be adapted to determine the effectiveness of command and control in NCW.  
 
Figure 14.   MORS Hierarchy of Metrics (From: Clark T & Moon T, 1999. “Assessing the 
Military Worth pf C4ISR Information. 7th International Command and Control 
Research and Technology Symposium).   
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While this hierarchy of metrics provided a comprehensive framework for C2 
evaluation, there was no universal agreement on the meaning of the broad range of terms. 
For example, the measures of effectiveness (how well something contributes to its 
particular context) which is mainly a qualitative set of assessment,  are very often 
confused with the quantitative measures of performance (how well the thing works by 
itself). (Bjorklund, 1995). 
C. SUMMARY 
It would be apparent by now, that the roadmap for NCW is not a linear process, 
one that we can mark out the phases clearly. Similar to the spiral software development 
process, it is cyclical or spiral, reiterative in nature. Continued evolution and efforts are 
required to shape and deliver the enhanced capability, towards the apex of maturity of the 
spiraling cone. However, the process is laden with great uncertainties and dynamics, 
coupled with the complexity of the task. Without unwavering leadership commitment and 
broad organizational acceptance, an effective framework to align the organization’s 
resources and focus its efforts, a robust, seamless, and secured infostructure to kick-start 
the process,  a closed-loop feedback and evaluation cycle, and an innovative and creative 
culture, the organization focus could go astray. The organization may cease to spiral 
upwards, but may either remain stagnant or spiral downwards as a result of depletive 
liability and wastages due to ineffective management and lack of focus.  
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VII.  ARCHITECTING NCW 
A. ARCHITECTURE AS AN APPROACH  
The previous chapter outlined the roadmap of NCW, in which an NCW 
architecture is established as a key element and approach to achieving success in 
implementing NCW. This chapter will propose and elaborate on such an architectural 
framework to help further our goals in NCW. The architecting approach adopted here has 
its roots in software design and development. This approach over the years has been 
adapted and modified for various enterprise applications. But why an architectural 
approach and how it will bring us closer to the NCW goals?  
Architecture is an abstraction of a system or systems (Clements et al., 2002). It 
represents systems in terms of abstract components that have externally visible properties 
and relationships. An NCW architecture will serve:  
a. As a Vehicle for Communication. Being a common abstraction of a 
system, an architecture serves as a vehicle for communication among stakeholders 
by providing a common ‘language’/platform that all stakeholders can understand 
and a ‘blueprint’ for the system that is to be built, modified, or  analyzed.  It also 
serves as a repository of information and references for  system developments.   
b. As a Manifestation of the Earliest Design Decision. Some of the earliest 
design decisions will eventually affect the flexibility and quality of 
outcome/product,  as well as correspondence between the structure of the system/s 
and organization.  Understanding and studying each of the earliest design 
decisions will avert disaster, or the need to undo the mistakes. This will mean 
greater productivity despite the time needed for a detailed architecting process.        
c. As a Reusable, Transferable Abstraction of a System. Once established, an 
architecture may serve as a reusable basis for the entire family of systems and 
each of the systems can be built using common assets or components. This will 
serve to enhance inter-operability, as well as optimize resources and efforts in the 
development of another system within the family.      
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B. ARCHITECTURAL CONCEPT AND FRAMEWORK   
The architecting concept proposed here is based on a three-level architecting 
process,  namely, Envisionment, Family of Systems (FoS), and System development (See 
Table 1). 
 
Level Architecting Process Purpose 
   1 Envisionment Capability Overview 
2 FoS Development Architectural-based Design 
Product-line optimization 
3 System Development Project management/ 
Outcome 
Table 1. Three-level Architecting Concept 
The first level, Envisionment, captures the capability overview or vision of NCW. 
It entails various views, namely technology drivers/advancement, standardization 
forecast, threats forecast and other factors to determine and project the requisite 
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specifically Air Defense, Strike, or Suppression of  Enemy Air Defense (SEAD). The 
FoS development takes two axes of integration to ensure optimal alignment of the 
organizational resources to deliver effective combat prowess in a most resource effective 
and asset efficient way. It is integrated vertically to align performance (both functional 
requirement and quality attributes) to attain the mission goals. In addition, it is optimized 
horizontally across the common functional elements such as ISR, C2, logistics, to 
optimize developmental effort and share assets.  
The architecting framework at the second level, FoS development, is built on a 
hybrid of both the Zachman’s framework and the transformational framework of the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) model.  (CIO Council, 1999). See 
Figure 16.  
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The Zachman’s approach ensures a comprehensive coverage of the perspectives 
(row) and focuses (column), while the transformational framework provides a transitional 
roadmap of extant, intermediate and final views of the architectures. The latter is 
incorporated to facilitate a smoother implementation process, with the transitional 
timeframe and requirements considered upfront. 
The last level of architecting, system development, provides architectural views of 
the individual systems similar to classic engineering approach, together with timeline and 
schedule to meet the envisioned capabilities. 
 Based on the architecture standards outlined in “Architecture Standards for 
Information System: a GST White Paper” (Percivall, 2002), the proposed architecture 
meets most, if not all, of the stipulated standards:  
a. Maintenance  Organization. This is not stated explicitly in the outline 
above as it would depend on the organization of the actual military establishment.  
It is expected that maintenance responsibility of the architecture must be formally 
assigned.  
b. Architecting Products. This is defined based on the three levels of 
abstractions and views collected through the hybrid framework.  
c.  Architecting Process. The architecting process is defined. Based on the 
specific military establishment, a more detailed process can be outlined with the 
responsible agency designated. 
d. Standards Category Model/Listing of Required Standards. This can be 
captured at the first level under the views for technology and standards forecasts.  
e.  Standards Development Process. This is not explicitly outlined in the 
architecture, but in the forecasting and adoption of standards, such a process must 
clearly exist or be developed.     
C. FoS / PRODUCTION LINE METHODOLOGY  
In his book “Design & Use of Software Architectures”, Bosch asserted that 
opportunistic software reuse is not effective in practice (Bosch, 2000). Extrapolated from 
his experience, designing NCW systems, which is increasingly software-heavy in 
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content, must be a planned and proactive effort. Bottom-up reuse, i.e., the composition of 
arbitrary components to construct systems, has not been effective in practice.  A family of 
systems or product line approach is an important tenet of the proposed architectural 
approach as it is effective not only to foster resource sharing and reuse, but perhaps 
equally important, to ensure greater degree of inter-operability and expedient 
development of future NCW systems.    
  The design process of a product line architecture (Bosch, 2000) for NCW may 
consist of five main steps:  
a. Feasibility Analysis. This first step is concerned with establishing the 
feasibility of framing an NCW capability/FoS within a production-line approach. 
Operational synergy and cost-effectiveness are two of the factors that would be 
considered during the analysis. The feasibility analysis also aims at determining 
the suitability of a evolutionary approach, that is, converting the legacy systems 
into a starting point for a FoS, or taking a revolutionary ‘greenfield’ approach.     
b. Scoping. This step determines the product and the product features that 
may be included in the production line or FoS. It must decide on the tradeoff 
between extending the boundaries to include more products/features in the 
production line and its impact on the core performance or quality attributes of the 
individual product.    
c. Product and feature planning. In order to ensure its existence is not short-
lived,  the product line must not focus on the current product and features but  
also plan for and anticipate future development and demands. This will make the 
incorporation of new products and features into the FoS easier.    
d. Product line architectural design. This is the key step in the conception of 
the FoS/production line. In the process of designing the architecture, two critical 
artifacts, namely the production-line components and variability, must be derived. 
The components are the basic constituents of products in the FoS/production line. 
The variability of the components will determine the scope and extent of systems 
that could be accommodated in the same product line.  
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e. Component requirement specification and development. This step is 
concerned with the requirements specification and development of each of the 
components.   
D. ARCHITECTURAL EVALUATION 
In order to ensure the architecture serves its purpose, continual architectural 
evaluation must be conducted to periodically validate the direction and fine-tune efforts 
to best meet the needs, and to avert disaster by detecting early signs of it. Architecture 
Tradeoff Analysis Method (ATAM) is a comprehensive way to conduct such an 
evaluation. It comprises four main groups of activities (Clements et al., 2002):  
a. Presentation. This is concerned with the exchanging and extracting of 
information of the nature of problems that the architecture is set out to address, 
and the key capability drivers (such as operational and technology). It aims to 
establish how the extant architecture addresses the problems and serves the  
driving factors of the capabilities. 
b. Investigation and Analysis. This phase assesses the key quality attributes 
requirements vis-à-vis the architectural approaches. It identifies the architectural 
approach, generates  the quality attribute utility tree through attribute 
characterization and instantiation, and then analyzes if the architecture is able to 
meet the performance requirements it sets out to meet. During this step, 
architectural risks, non-risks, sensitivity points and tradeoff points are identified.    
c. Testing. This step involves activities to further test and validate if the 
architectural approach addresses the needs through scenario-based assessment. 
The stakeholders first brainstorm and collect a large set of scenarios which are 
then prioritized via a voting process. The high priority scenarios are then tested 
against the architecture to determine the robustness and effectiveness of the 
architecture. Additional concerns or assurances may be further consolidated.    
d. Reporting. This involves the consolidation and reporting of the results of 
the evaluation.  
Other evaluation methods exist such as the Software Architecture Analysis 
Method (SAAM), and Active Reviews for Intermediate Designs (ARID). They can also 
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be selectively employed to serve our purpose. ATAM is a comprehensive evaluation 
methodology, but requires considerable stakeholder participation, which seems 
appropriate for major revolution/evolutionary changes such as NCW in our case where 
new capabilities or major modifications are undertaken. SAAM is a much simpler 
process which can be used during an afternoon to gain key architectural insights. It helps 
architects understand how their designs would react to evolutionary pressures that lead to 
modifications, as well as how well the designs provided the functionality demanded by 
their users. ARID is best suited for evaluating a partial design in its infancy and used to 
probe an architecture in ways hat the ATAM is not designed for.  
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter outlines a framework for developing NCW architectures, as well as 
the key steps in orchestrating FoS/product line architecture design and in conducting 
architecture evaluation.  The proposed framework provides a comprehensive 
methodology and artifacts to address the anticipated needs of NCW. While a segmented 
approach is initiated along capability boundaries, it is important to note that the segment 
approach does not deliver the end-state or the final product. It is an initial  approach to 
scope the problem within more manageable boundaries. Thus, it should not stop there. 
Once the segment architectures are fairly developed and manageable, the next stage of a 
holistic study, scrutinizing more on the cross-segment integration, should kick in. 
Another risk of the architectural approach outline is that because it is a comprehensive 
process and takes time and efforts, there is risk that people involved may replace 
architecting for delivery. The focus of the effort must emphasized on the delivery of 
enhanced capabilities. For that purpose, specific timelines may have to be set, and the 
architectural team must not have too long a time to come up with the perfect architecture. 
Rather, a spiral or evolutionary approach will better serve to continually advance the 
NCW goals. Importantly, the complexity of architecting for NCW should not be for the 
esoteric few, but rather the entire organization must be educated on the entire 
















VIII.  CONCLUSION 
A. THE NEW CIRCUS MAXIMUS 
Advances in information technology have brought about revolutionary changes 
that pervade every corners of our life. This new Circus Maximus introduces new and 
revolutionary ways of conducting warfare – Network Centric Warfare which is premised 
on networked connectivity and information superiority. While initiated by technology, 
the new revolution is not just about technology application, it is about a new co-evolution 
of the entire span of military affairs, from organization, operational concepts, doctrine, 
training/education,  to new military systems. The nature of this new information age 
warfare has provided great challenges in command and control.  In this final chapter, 
some of these challenges and potential pitfalls are discussed.     
B. C2 CHALLENGES   
The nature of NCW imposes great challenges in the arena of command and 
control. First and foremost, command and control is becoming dramatically more 
complex as a result of compressed space and time, and the deluge of information. Yet, we 
are lagging behind in our capability to keep up with the increasing demands for 
information management, and more importantly, to transform this information to war-
winning battle knowledge. Given the complex human behavior that drives the nature of 
command and control, our search for the Rosetta Stone of Measure of 
Effectiveness/Performance (MoE/MoP) of C2 also remains elusive.  
1. New and Smarter Ways 
Technology has compressed the space and time continuum, and political realities 
have collapsed the clear separations among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels 
by introducing more dynamic rules of engagement. The wired world has made the 
process non-linear, and we can no longer resolve problems effectively in a reductivist 
fashion – the top-down function–driven approach to break down a complex task to simple 
functional blocks. We must take into account greater number of entities, their interactions 
and mutual influences to determine the effects all at the same instant.  
As a result of the increased tempo, warfare is no longer a series of static events, it 
is becoming seamlessly intertwined requiring greater integration and timely interactions 
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between the heretofore disparate planning and execution processes. In order to exploit the 
opportunity provided by NCW to expedite the speed of command,  we could no longer 
adhere strictly to the highly structured, cyclic, and time-table-driven C2 processes. A 
continuous process whereby combat entities self-synchronize to the mission objectives of 
the higher command seems to be the new order. However, in the process to optimize a 
myriad of requirements by transcending the highly institutionalized C2 cycle, we stand 
the risk of degrading to a state of laissez faire which the very existence of C2 cycle is 
intended to avoid. We need to devise adequate control mechanisms at the higher HQ to 
align the action of the combat entities while entrusting and allowing the combat entities 
the liberty and latitude of actions to self-synchronize to the mission objectives. 
Technology has allowed us to act and respond quickly due to faster and wider 
bandwidth for communications. The wider connectivity allows command and control to 
span a wider area of responsibility – we are co-ordinating well beyond our optimal limit 
of 5-7 entities that human factor experts deemed that we are capable of. At the same time, 
as information sources and communication bandwidth grow, and our networks become 
more extensive, information that command and control processes have access to and 
manage is increasing by orders of magnitude. So, apart from speeding up tasks, we need 
to handle a exponentially increasing number of sources. Figure 17 highlights some of 
these fundamental problems based on data collected on accessing of information during 
the Bridge to Global (BTG) preparatory exercise. (Kemple, 1999).   
Today, we rely on software development and information systems to provide us 
with the tools to deal with the information management problems.  With NCW and the 
demands for greater inter-operability, software development is facing an uphill task of 
truly integrating the systems into the C2 process that infiltrates functional areas, 
acquisition processes, organizational structures and the mind-set of all involved. Yet,  
while our reliance on software increases, the results of software development have been 
dismaying. Over the years, less than 10% of the software systems have met the 
requirements, within budget and schedule.  Breakthroughs in software engineering and 
development methodology are badly needed to provide us the effective tools to avert the 
increasingly serious problem of information overload. 
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Figure 17.   Barriers to Information Access (From:  Kemple, W and others. 1999. Building 
Adaptive Organizations: A Bridge from Basic Research to Operational 
Exercises.)  
Command and control has growth in complexity in order of magnitude over the 
years in terms of both breadth and depth. On top of that, the time available to perform the 
task is getting shorter. Software development on which we relied so heavily to generate 
the tools to address some of these problems is lagging seriously behind. Clearly, it is no 
longer adequate for us just to try harder. We cannot remain in our old mindset and 
thinking models. New and smarter ways of operating and overcoming the current 
predicament must be found.    
2. Change Management  
Change management has never been easy, particularly for a large organization. 
Even more so, when today’s military organizations are faced with both a problem of 
misfit between the organization and operating philosophy, and continuous waves of 
disruptive innovations.  
Since the Napoleonic era, the hierarchical nature of command and control has 
been the mainstay and de-facto organizational principle for military organization. The 
hierarchical structure facilitates task division, ensures accurate dissemination of orders 
and plans, and supervises execution. In fact, the success of command and control is 
sometimes deemed as the ability of the commander to exercise tight control and 
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supervision to focus war efforts and orchestrate battle. Yet, the benefits offered by NCW 
is inherently at odds with the hierarchical structure. The dramatic expediting of the speed 
of command depends on simultaneous and instantaneous dissemination of information 
and the by-passing of organization layers to  achieve the improved responsiveness. This 
has created many contentious issues and contradictions such as the rationale for central 
planning, autonomy of combat entities and so on.  
Clearly, key aspects and attributes of Network Centric Warfare are fundamentally 
disruptive in nature. Disruptive innovation is about bringing to fruition ideas or products 
that are very different from the status quo. This form of innovation which is associated 
with revolutionary changes usually brings about great uncertainties and changes, which in 
turn generate more resistance and impediments for change. In fact, the competencies that 
organizations develop in becoming successful at sustaining innovations (improving 
performance of existing products or  services) create impediments to disruptive 
innovation (U.S. DoD, 2001).  For example, information sharing and collaboration 
disrupt existing organizational decision making processes, authorities, and values based 
on information compartmentalization, centralized planning, and chain-of-command. 
Allocating resources to the networking of the force, potentially at the expense of platform 
and weapon acquisition and “modernization,” threatens existing “platform-centric” power 
structures.  
Each new revolution in military affairs brings about a new set of values and 
thinking. To successfully bring about the new revolution and change, it is fundamental to 
transform the inherent organization culture and mindset, which many times proves to be 
most difficult and protracted. The recognition that this ‘inner’ change must take place is a 
start to grapple with the issues, which no amount of hardware and technology can 
replace.  
3.  The Search for the Rosetta Stone 
Since the 1970s, the search for an objective solution in measuring the 
performance of command and control has been on. The efforts have intensified over the 
years, as command and control has emerged from being a peripheral function to become 
a critical link and force multiplier of capabilities. However, the search for this Rosetta 
stone has so far proved to be elusive. A key problem is the difficulty in defining the value 
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of information and the contributing factors to the success of C2 (Bjorklund, 1995). The 
complexity of military organization with its many interacting and mutually influencing 
entities, and its dynamic and uncertain operating environment largely contributes to it. As 
a result, the commander’s decisions do not always determine the results of combat, and 
the outcome varies greatly with changes in the situation. Even when the commander’s 
decision has significant bearing on the outcome, the random nature of combat means that 
the commander is only influencing the probability of outcomes rather than influencing 
the outcome themselves. The unstable and random nature of combat also make 
predictions difficult.  Moreover, the complex human psychological make-up clouds the 
problem. It is almost impossible to evaluate objectively psychological (and even 
emotional) preferences for C2.  
The ability to measure  the effectiveness/performance  of C2 is critical, without it 
we cannot focus our C2 investment and efforts. Yet, after all these years of effort, the 
Rosetta stone is still waiting to be discovered.   
C. AVOIDING THE PITFALLS  
There is no absence of exaggerated claims and misinformation clouding the 
concept of NCW. It is also important to note some of the apparent lessons and limitations 
of NCW to avoid the major pitfalls on our road towards NCW.   
 1. More Is Not Always  Better 
Information and networking are the twin engines for NCW. However, more does 
not always means merrier. Judicious operational judgment and financial prudence must 
prevail in proliferating and networking the forces. More information is not always better.  
Dissemination of information does not guarantee assimilation. Excessive information 
processing will indeed overload, and worse, incapacitate the ability to access more  
critical information. More connectivity is not always better. More nodes out there means 
more nodes to maintain, protect and secure. Without serving a purpose, additional 
connectivity will only be a cost liability. In fact, Metcalfe’s law does not guarantee that  
increasing connectivity automatically translates to operational effectiveness. The law 
merely relates to potential gains. In establishing the information and connectivity needs, 
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the organization, doctrine, operating concept, training and all other key elements must be 
considered.  
 2. The Myth of Reducing Cost  
Cost reduction, whether in actual capital investment or recurring IT cost, has often 
been used to justify the pursuit for NCW. However, such optimism may be misleading. 
As an analogy, the pursuit for Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) in the 
business/commercial sector has been going on for years. Yet, few companies have made 
that giant leap successfully, and even fewer, if any, have done it and achieved cost 
saving. This is not to dispute the justification for NCW. In fact, it is probably true that 
there are no other alternatives to NCW in the information age. There may be no solution 
more cost-effective than NCW. But, that is not the same as saying that it would actually 
lead to saving or reduction in current cost. With the increasing dependency and growing 
complexity in IT, the cost will only follow the upward trend. But with astute operational 
judgment and financial prudence, we may hope to  reduce wastage and stretch the dollars. 
Take the PC as an example; while memory and hardware have reduced in cost, our 
insatiable demands for higher computing power and greater processing speed have not 
necessarily reduced the price of a home PC.   
3. The Myth of Global Situational Awareness 
NCW has promised the distribution of a common and global situational 
awareness. However, it has reduced the notion of situational awareness to the common 
battlespace picture that is being proliferated. This simplistic approach ignores the 
complexity of modern warfare, the professional training and experience needed to 
interpret the information, and the key process of converting information to war-winning 
battle knowledge. Such a notion is dangerous as it trivializes the importance of training 
and experience, and encourages reckless network behavior such as excessive information 
forwarding. Information needs to be managed. It needs to be interpreted and assimilated 
so as to be useful in decision making.  
D. SUMMARY  
NCW offers great opportunities, the ability to speed up command, the ultimate 
mobility that replaces movement of troops with movement of information, the precise  
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stand-off targeting, and so on. While we have yet to realize its full potential, we are 
beginning to have a glimpse of the promises held by NCW in some of the recent 
operations and campaigns.  The road leading to NCW is laden with daunting challenges, 
though we are beginning to understand some of them.  NCW is not  just a revolution of 
technology, it requires continuous co-evolution of the full spectrum of elements in  
military affairs to bring about the dramatic increase in combat prowess. We need to 
transcend and integrate across   a number of dimensions including time, geography, 
platform, and functions. We need to manage the transformation through a methodical 
enterprise framework to focus our efforts and align our resources. We need an open and 
learning environment to experiment and develop new and smarter ways of operation. We 
need broad acceptance and unwavering commitment to stay the course for the long haul.  
There is neither a magic panacea to overcome these problems nor a flying carpet 
to bring us to the end of the journey instantaneously. The secret to arriving at the 
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